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ABSTRACT
The doctrine of unconscionability is encrusted with myths. First-year
law students are taught that the doctrine was created in the twentieth century. Unconscionability is often presented as a novel one, born in the Uniform Commercial Code’s adoption of Section 2-302 in the mid-twentieth
century. Even those scholars who are willing to look a bit further afield
than the twentieth century for the origins of the unconscionability doctrine typically only reach the mid-eighteenth century. In addition to
myths surrounding its origin, the doctrine has been presented as a dangerously vague and imprecise concept. Commentators and scholars have likewise characterized the doctrine as a license for courts to refuse,
unpredictably and arbitrarily, to enforce some contracts. Some claim its
application has the potential to destroy all of contract law. Beyond the
fearmongering myths, another standard myth taught to first-year law students is that to succeed on a claim of unconscionability a party must offer
at least some proof of both procedural and substantive unconscionability.
This Article will thus attempt to dispel the following three myths
about unconscionability:
•
•
•

It is a new, modern doctrine of law,
Its application is unpredictable and arbitrary, and
To prevail a party must prove both procedural and substantive
unconscionability.

The best way to dispel myths is through facts. This Article attempts to
clear the clouds of confusion and fear surrounding the doctrine by turning to historical and empirical fact. Part I of this Article looks to the an* Orpha and Maurice Merrill Chair in Law, University of Oklahoma. I am
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cient past and finds that the idea that justice, and hence the law, should
grant a remedy to at least some people who enter into inequitable bargains, is as old as philosophizing about justice itself (and certainly older
than the mid-eighteenth century). Rather than a dangerous modern innovation, this principle of justice has ancient philosophical roots in Aristotle
and ancient legal roots in Roman law. Part II of the Article summarizes
prior attempts to assess the doctrine of unconscionability through empirical research by summarizing the results of prior work and identifies
the limited scope of those projects. Part III contains the results of the
comprehensive empirical analysis of what appears to be happening in
cases involving claims of unconscionability in the period 2013–2017. A
comprehensive coding process was undertaken for all reported federal
and state cases decided over this five-year period. The results of the data
analysis of 463 federal and state cases suggest that whatever the casebooks
and law review articles claim about the doctrine, its application in real
courts on the ground is very predictable and simpler than a two-part requirement suggests. The Article concludes with a proposal to reformulate
the doctrine to conform better to both its historical roots and its application by courts in real cases.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss4/2

2

McCall: Demystifying Unconscionability: A Historical and Empirical Analys

2020]

DEMYSTIFYING UNCONSCIONABILITY

775

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. ANCIENT HISTORICAL ROOTS: JUSTICE AND VOLUNTARY
EXCHANGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Ancient Philosophical Roots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Ancient Legal Roots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Christian Development of the Ancient Roots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Modern Distortions of the Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E. Resurrection of a Concept in the Uniform Commercial Code . .
II. PRIOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. The Federal Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The North Carolina Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. The Price Provision Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. The Arbitration Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E. The California Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Summary of Overall Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Nature of the Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Common Characteristics of the Parties or Contracts . . . . . . . . . .
E. Types of Unconscionable Clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
F. Legal Standard for Assessing Unconscionability . . . . . . . . . . . .
G. Logistic Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020

776
778
778
779
780
784
786
789
789
790
791
791
792
792
793
794
800
801
805
810
816
823
829

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 2

776

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65: p. 773

INTRODUCTION

T

HE doctrine of unconscionability is encrusted with myths. First-year
law students are taught that “no explicit doctrine of unconscionability
surfaced until the twentieth century.”1 The doctrine is presented as a
novel one, born in the Uniform Commercial Code’s (UCC) adoption of
Section 2-302 in the mid-twentieth century.2 Even those scholars who are
willing to look a bit further afield than the twentieth century for the origins of the unconscionability doctrine typically only reach the mid-eighteenth century.3 In addition to myths surrounding its origin,
commentators have presented the doctrine as a dangerously vague and
imprecise concept. Beginning with Arthur Leff’s seminal article on the
topic, this attack on the doctrine began to take root. Leff’s frontal assault
on the doctrine is summed up in the following conclusion: “If reading this
section [UCC 2-302] makes anything clear it is that reading this section
alone makes nothing clear about the meaning of ‘unconscionable’ except
perhaps that it is pejorative.”4 Leff considers the first batch of cases decided after the adoption of UCC Section 2-302 as exhibiting a “dangerous
. . . tendency.”5 Following in Leff’s footsteps, later commentators and
scholars have likewise characterized the doctrine as a license for courts to
refuse, unpredictably and arbitrarily, to enforce some contracts. For example, Colleen McCullough documents that courts and scholars worry
that the doctrine “lacks predictability and consistency, and that [its] liberal use could swallow all of contract law.”6 Professor William D. Hawkland calls UCC Section 2-302 “the most controversial section in the entire
Code”7 and claims that this doctrine “violates freedom of contract and
creates instability.”8 From such quotations one would conclude that unconscionability is a potential cancer that could destroy the entire field of
contract law.
Beyond the fearmongering myths, another standard myth taught to
first-year law students is that to succeed on a claim of unconscionability, a
1. BEN TEMPLIN, CONTRACTS: A MODERN COURSEBOOK 372 (2d ed. 2019).
Templin does acknowledge that a precursor to the doctrine existed in the refusal
of courts of equity to specifically enforce unfair bargains. Id.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Richard J. Hunter Jr., Unconscionability Revisited: A Comparative Approach, 68 N.D. L. REV. 145, 145 (1992) (claiming that unconscionability “had been
developed as early as the mid-1750s to deal with essentially unequal contractual
situations”). Professor James Gordley is an exception to this general observation.
See infra Section I.D.
4. Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—the Emperor’s New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967).
5. Id. at 488–89.
6. Colleen McCullough, Unconscionability as a Coherent Legal Concept, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. 779, 782 (2016).
7. WILLIAM HAWKLAND ET AL., U.C.C. SERIES § 2-302:1 Art. 2 (Carl S. Bjerre
ed., 1997–1999).
8. Id.
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party must offer at least some proof of both procedural and substantive
unconscionability.9 One of Leff’s arguments appears to hit the mark:
there is unresolved ambiguity in the text and history of UCC Section 2-302
as to whether or to what extent it is designed to police “bargaining naughtiness” or “evils in the resulting contract.”10 This unresolved tension has
resulted in a myth that at least some level of both types of “naughtiness”
are necessary to prevail with courts.
This Article will thus attempt to dispel the following three myths
about unconscionability:
•
•
•

It is a new, modern doctrine of law,
Its application is unpredictable and arbitrary, and
To prevail a party must prove both procedural and substantive
unconscionability.

The best way to dispel myths is through facts. This Article attempts to
clear the clouds of confusion and fear surrounding the doctrine by turning to historical and empirical fact. Part I of this Article looks to the ancient past and finds that the idea that justice, and hence the law, should
grant a remedy to at least some people who enter into inequitable bargains is as old as philosophizing about justice itself (and certainly older
than the mid-eighteenth century). Rather than a dangerous modern innovation, this principle of justice has ancient philosophical roots in Aristotle
and ancient legal roots in Roman law. Leff may be right that Section 2-302
cannot be read “alone” for its meaning to be clear. If read in the larger
historical context, its meaning may become clearer. Part II of the Article
summarizes prior attempts to assess the doctrine of unconscionability
through empirical research by summarizing the results of prior work and
identifies the limited scope of those projects. Part III contains the results
of the comprehensive empirical analysis of what appears to be happening
in cases involving claims of unconscionability in the period 2013–2017. A
comprehensive coding process was undertaken for all reported federal
and state cases decided over this five-year period. The results of the data
analysis suggest that despite what the casebooks and law review articles
claim about the doctrine, its application in real courts on the ground is
very predictable and simpler than a two-part requirement suggests.

9. See, e.g., TEMPLIN, supra note 1, at 372 (“Unconscionability requires both (1)
procedural unconscionability, and (2) substantive unconscionability.”).
10. Leff, supra note 4, at 487.
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VOLUNTARY EXCHANGE

A. Ancient Philosophical Roots
As early as Aristotle, philosophers recognized that exchange transactions were necessary for the flourishing of a society11 but argued that justice required that things exchanged be equal in value.12 As each party
mutually benefits from an exchange (each needs what the other possesses), one party should not disproportionately bear the costs.13 Aristotle
explains: “But in dealings of exchange justice is such that it includes reciprocation according to proportionality but not according to equality.”14 By
proportionality, Aristotle means that things exchanged must equate in
value—not mere quantity. It seems obvious that to exchange one pair of
shoes for one house would be an unjust exchange, even if it involves the
exchange of one item for one item. The shoemaker would acquire a great
increase in wealth in exchange for his pair of shoes. Thus, Aristotle argues
a proportionate equality of value must be maintained.15 Commutative justice does not require that all people possess equal wealth; the distribution
of wealth in a community is a matter not of commutation but of distributive justice.16 It may be that certain individuals in a society should possess
greater honor or wealth than others “according to a certain merit.”17 Yet,
this distribution is judged just or unjust (and thereby adjusted) by taking
into account the relationships among the members of a society such as
their talents and status. Once a principle of just distribution is established,
distributions should be adjusted according to the principle.18 If unequal
exchange transactions were to occur, these transactions would result in a
11. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARIES
ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V 1133a5–14 (C.J. Litzinger, O.P. trans.,
Dumb Ox Books 1964) [hereinafter Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics]; ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS, COMMENTARIES ON ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS Lecture VIII, 975
(C.J. Litzinger, O.P. trans., Dumb Ox Books 1964) [hereinafter AQUINAS,
COMMENTARIES].
12. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 11, at V, 1131b27–32 (“[I]n transactions the just thing is an equal—and the unjust thing an unequal . . . .”).
13. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. II–II, Q. 77, art. 1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Burns Oats & Washbourne Ltd. 2d
rev. ed. 1912–1927) (1265–1274) [hereinafter AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA]
(“Now whatever is established for the common advantage, should not be more of a
burden to one party than to another.”).
14. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 11, at V, 1132b31–33.
15. This necessity explains the invention of money. Because a homebuilder
would likely not want to receive the number of shoes proportionate to the value of
one house, money was invented to facilitate such exchanges. Instead of exchanging many shoes, the shoemaker can sell many pairs of shoes to different people for
a standard medium of exchange, or money, and then exchange the amount of
money equal to a house with the homebuilder. See id. at V, 1133a19–1133b29.
16. Id. at V, 1130b30–33, 1131a15–29.
17. Id. at V, 1131a24–29.
18. Aristotle acknowledges that different societies may select different principles of distribution by adopting different understandings of merit (such as noble
birth or degree of freedom or virtue). Id.
ON
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random redistribution of wealth not necessarily consistently with distributive justice. If wealth should be redistributed at all it should be done according to a normative scheme, not on the basis of random exchange
transactions.19 Although Aristotle does not work out a complete explanation for the practical calculation of values and for rectifying unequal exchanges, he does suggest that one of the functions of the law (in the form
of justice meted out by a judge) is to correct redistributions of wealth
caused by unjust exchanges (voluntary and involuntary).20
An apparent contradiction exists in the philosophy of Aristotle (as
well as Plato). Although recognizing society’s need for exchanges, Aristotle was skeptical of tradesmen (those engaged in exchange for an occupation) and only reluctantly allowed them into his ideal community.21
The theory of the Just Price can be seen as a reconciliation of the recognition of the necessity of exchange transactions but wariness of those who
facilitate them. A reader can interpret Aristotle as arguing that exchange
is necessary for society, but an exchange economy is not sustainable unless
proportionality is maintained.22 Yet, Aristotle recognizes that many
tradesmen had a penchant for regularly engaging in unjust exchanges. It
was those unequal exchanges that must be constrained by the law to sustain the system.
B.

Ancient Legal Roots

Aristotle’s notion of justice in commutations was transmitted through
Roman civilization but only in a limited fashion. Roman jurisprudence
accepted the notion that parties to a transaction could take advantage of
one another to achieve a gain from their dealings: in buying and selling,
natural law permits the “one party to buy for less and the other to sell for
more, and thus each [party] is allowed to outwit the other.”23 As a result,
Roman law would enforce “an agreement concluded with mutual consent”
19. See James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587, 1591 (1981).
20. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 11, at V, 1132a19–25. This
direction to bring an unjust commutation to a judge for adjustment clearly contemplates its application to voluntary exchange transactions. Aristotle states,
“when men are in doubt they have recourse to a judge.” Id. An involuntary exchange such as theft would not involve the parties doubting the equality of their
actions and Aristotle must have in mind the context of a voluntary exchange such
as a sale.
21. See DIANA WOOD, MEDIEVAL ECONOMIC THOUGHT 71, 111 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2002); see also ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. I, ch. 8, 1256a–b, 1257a–b, at
63–70 (Oxford ed., B. Jowett trans., Clarendon Press 1905) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, POLITICS].
22. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 11, at V, 1133a.21–25 (“If this
[reciprocal equality] is not observed, there will be neither exchange nor sharing.”); see also AQUINAS, COMMENTARIES, supra note 11, at V, Lecture IX, 980; WOOD,
supra note 21, at 71.
23. Gordley, supra note 19, at 1601 (quoting JUSTINIAN, DIGEST, 19.2.22 para.
3); see also JUSTINIAN, DIGEST, 4.4.16 para. 4 (“[I]t is naturally permitted to parties
to circumvent each other in the price of buying and selling.”).
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even if the price agreed were “a little less than its true value.”24 Although
these texts seem to contradict Aristotle, Roman law also contained other
principles that mitigated this one. The Roman jurist Pomponius stated,
“By the law of nature it is equitable that no person becomes rich by the
loss and injustice to another.”25 Thus, freedom of contract (legal enforceability of unjust exchange transactions) was in tension with the principle
that nobody should profit by the loss to another. Although Roman law
would not generally grant a legal remedy solely on the basis of an unequal
exchange, texts do acknowledge the recognition that disproportionate exchanges were unjust, by referring to a thing’s “true price” (verii pretii) or a
“just price” (justi pretii).26 Finally, in at least the context of the sale of land
at less than one half the true value, Roman law did permit the seller to
bring a legal action, lesio enormis, either to refund the price received and
regain the land, or receive increased compensation up to the just price, at
the buyer’s option.27 Thus, Roman law, although embodying the idea that
bargains should be enforced regardless of their injustice, did constrain the
application of that principle in the context of unjust purchases of real
estate. As subsequent legal history will demonstrate, the difference between Aristotle and Roman law is not one of principle but in its practical
application. Philosophy requires consistency of principles, whereas law as
a practical discipline need not be as consistent in its proscriptions.28
C. Christian Development of the Ancient Roots
Whereas Roman law was, except for lesio enormis, tolerant of many unjust exchanges, Christianity reinvigorated the Aristotelian principle only
partially present in Roman law. St. Paul, in a passage that strikingly parallels a text in Roman law,29 teaches that the divine law is contrary to such
permissiveness. He says:
For you know what precepts I have given to you by the Lord
Jesus. For this is the will of God, your sanctification . . . that no
man overreach, nor circumvent his brother in business: because
the Lord is the avenger of all these things, as we have told you
before, and have testified.30
Christians are obligated by divine “precept” and the “will of God” not
to overreach or circumvent in transactions, even if such outwitting is per24. JUSTINIAN, CODEX, 4.44.8.
25. JUSTINIAN, DIGEST, 50.17.206 (author’s translation of “Iure naturae aequum
est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuira fieri locupletiorem”).
26. JUSTINIAN, CODEX, 4.44.2, 4.44.8.
27. Id.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 41–49.
29. JUSTINIAN, DIGEST, 4.4.16 para. 4 (“[I]t is naturally permitted to parties to
circumvent each other in the price of buying and selling.”).
30. 1 Thes. 4: 2–3, 6 (Douai Rheims ed.) (omitted intervening verses referring
to precepts against sins of the flesh).
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mitted by civil law. As the Western legal tradition developed, jurists, relying on Aristotelian theories of justice31 and divine revelation prohibiting
“overreaching” in exchange transactions, began to expand the limited applicability of lesio enormis beyond the sale of real estate under the rubric of
the doctrine of the just price. Medieval jurists, who came to understand
the remedy of lesio enormis in the Roman Codex as a limited embodiment of
Aristotle’s principle of proportionality in exchange, worked to expand the
application of the Roman remedy to more settings beyond the sale of
land.32 By the time of the late scholastics of the sixteenth century and the
modern natural law scholars of the seventeenth century, a general consensus among jurists and theologians existed that held that justice required,
and in many cases law should require, correction of unjust contractual
exchanges, although different authors might disagree as to particular aspects of the consensus.33 The general consensus of scholars justified the
limitation of a remedy only to exchanges that involved only a great difference from the just price (as opposed to any difference) by explaining that,
although any variation from the just price is against the virtue of justice,
for practical reasons, the law can only correct great variations from
justice.34
St. Thomas Aquinas masterfully integrates Aristotelian philosophy
with legal practice by defending the universality of the principle of the just
price and its limited application in human law. He argues that every sale
at any variation from the just price violates the virtue of justice that requires proportionality in exchange,35 but that human law can only enforce
restitution when either an exchange is agreed with knowledge that the
price is unjust36 or when the variation from the common estimation of the
just price is great (“nimius excessus”) regardless of knowledge.37 One inference drawn from this two-part analysis of when human law should correct
unjust prices—intentional and large variations from just price—is that the
31. John W. Baldwin, The Medieval Theories of the Just Price, 49 TRANSACTIONS
AM. PHIL. SOC’Y, 10 (1959).
32. Gordley, supra note 19, at 1638–39.
33. Id. at 1603–04.
34. See, e.g., AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 13, at Q. 77, art. 1, Reply to Obj. 1; Gordley, supra note 19, at 1641.
35. See AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 13, at Q.77, art. 1.
36. See id. (St. Thomas uses the word deceit (fraus), a term which requires
acting with knowledge); see also Huguccio, Summa Decretorum, to Causa X, q.2, c.2
Hoc ius, quoted in Baldwin, supra note 31, at 56 n. 118 (1959) (“[C]redo tamen nec
ecclesiam nec aliquem hominem ex scientia certa debere plus accipere quam res valeat, presertim si plus offertur per licitationem,”—meaning, “I believe, nevertheless, neither a
church nor any man, with certain knowledge, ought to accept more than a thing
is worth, especially if more is offered in the bidding” (emphasis added in
translation)).
37. See AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 13, at Q.77, art. 1, Reply to
Obj. 1 (“Accordingly, if without employing deceit the seller disposes of his goods
for more than their worth, or the buyer obtain them for less than their worth, the
law looks upon this as licit, and provides no punishment for so doing, unless the
excess be too great.”).
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law should correct even some unintentional violations when the difference
is great.
Putting aside difficulties of determining with precision the common
estimation of the value of something, the thing sold may have a hidden
defect that makes the item exchanged worth less than the common estimation of the value of such things in general. St. Thomas explains that if the
defect is later discovered, the seller must repay a portion of the price attributable to the impairment of value resulting from the defect.38 Although one is not subjectively culpable for unwittingly selling something
at an unjust price (due to the latent defect), once the defect is discovered,
the seller is obligated to compensate for the defect. St. Thomas explains:
But if any of the foregoing defects be in the thing sold, and he
knows nothing about this, the seller does not sin, because he
does that which is unjust materially, nor is his deed unjust, as
shown above . . . . Nevertheless, he is bound to compensate the buyer,
when the defect comes to his knowledge. Moreover, what has been said
of the seller applies equally to the buyer. For sometimes it happens that the seller thinks his goods to be specifically of lower
value, as when a man sells gold instead of copper, and then if the
buyer be aware of this, he buys it unjustly and is bound to restitution . . . .39
Thus, the obligations of the Just Price doctrine are applicable to transactions independent of the obligation not to lie or commit fraud (by, for
example, denying or concealing a known defect). This point makes a
clear distinction between the traditional doctrine synthesized by Aquinas
that understood the disparity in value as a reason for a remedy in and of
itself and the nineteenth century approach, discussed infra,40 that came to
see disparity of value not as justifying a remedy in itself but as mere evidence of some intentional deceit.
Limiting a legal remedy only to an exchange knowingly at variance
with the just price or an exchange unintentionally (but at a great difference) did not mean abandonment of the more rigorous normative principle of justice. As St. Thomas reminds his readers, “On the other hand the
Divine law41 leaves nothing unpunished that is contrary to virtue. Hence,
according to the divine law, it is reckoned unlawful if the equality of justice be not observed in buying and selling.”42 Thus, one who discovers a
38. See id. at Q. 77, art. 2.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. See infra Section I.D.
41. One of the purposes of the divine law is to make known more clearly
primary moral principles of action contained in the natural law. See Brian M. McCall, Consulting the Architect When Problems Arise: The Divine Law, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 103 (2011).
42. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 13, at Q.77, art. 1, Reply to Obj.
1 (“On the other hand the Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is contrary
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slight unintended benefit from an unjust exchange may not be obligated
under human law to make restitution but may still be obligated in justice
and by divine law to restore the difference. Yet, even the divine law may
not demand restitution of small differences in particular cases. This is due
to the practical difficulties in determining, with precision, the just price
that may make it difficult or impossible to know with moral certainty that
one has benefited slightly from a disproportionate exchange. As a result,
Aquinas concludes that restitution even under the divine law may be obligatory only if the variation is notable (i.e., great enough that it can be
ascertained with reasonable certainty).43
St. Thomas, in drawing a distinction between the requirements of
human law and divine law, emphasizes that divine law condemns as immoral any unrestored notable variation from the just price even if, for
practical and prudential reasons, human law tolerates greater variations in
value than mere notable ones. One reason for the circumspection of
human law originates in the recognition that the just price can change
over time44 and cannot always be determined with precision but only estimated. An estimate implies a defined range between a high and low price.
These practical difficulties require human law to mandate restitution only
when the unjust exchange is intentional or the variance from the just price
is great.45 Thus, for example, Roman law considered only a variation of
more than one half of the just price of land to be great enough to intervene.46 The post-Roman period of Western Catholic law in Europe saw
the gradual expansion of this remedy to a wider range of great variations
than the original Roman remedy, yet it never required remediation of all
to virtue. Hence, according to the Divine law, it is reckoned unlawful if the equality of justice be not observed in buying and selling.”).
43. See id. (“[H]e who has received more than he ought must make compensation to him that has suffered loss, if the loss be considerable [notabile damnum]. I
add this condition, because the just price of things is not fixed with mathematical
precision [punctaliter determinatum], but depends on a kind of estimate [aestimatione], so that a slight addition or subtraction would not seem to destroy the equality of justice.”).
44. See JUSTINIAN, DIGEST, 35.2.63.2 (“Sometimes place or time brings a variation [uarietatem] in value; oil will not be equally valued at Rome and in Spain nor
given the same assessment [aestimabitur] in periods of lasting scarcity as when there
are crops . . . .”) (author’s translation); see also AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra
note 13, at Q. 77, art. 3, Reply to Obj. 4.
45. For a discussion of why human law must be in accord with divine law but
need not always strictly enforce the principles of justice in all cases, see AQUINAS,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 13, at Q. 96, art. 2 (“Now human law is framed for
a number of human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue.
Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but
only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain;
and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which
human society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft
and such like.”).
46. JUSTINIAN, CODEX, 4.44.2, 4.44.8.
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deviations from the just price.47 Although there appears to be no historical data to quantify how often a contract party prevailed in obtaining relief
under Just Price doctrine in civil or ecclesiastical courts in the ancient and
medieval world,48 Professor Odinet characterizes the use of the French
version of the doctrine in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as
“rampant in the French courts.”49 Thus, we can conclude in general that
after its expansion in the medieval period, the remedy was more widely
available on the eve of its disappearance from Anglo-American law.
D. Modern Distortions of the Principles
The modern era beginning in the late eighteenth century witnessed
the contraction of the Just Price doctrine in civil law countries and its disappearance in Anglo-American law. In the modern era, both the French
code and the German civil codes have preserved some limited aspects of
the original Roman law remedy (as developed by later Christian jurists) to
grant some relief to parties on the basis that the bargain was too oppressive or the values exchanged too disproportionate.50 Although attempts
were made to abolish any remedies for disproportionate exchanges from
both the Napoleonic Code and the German Civil Code, late interventions
(by Napoleon himself51 in the case of France) restored provisions providing a remedy in at least some cases to both countries’ codes.52
Even though some provisions granting a remedy in limited circumstances remained in the continental codes, jurists attempted to explain the
remedy not in classical terms of justice in exchange but rather in terms of
correcting some flaw in the contracting process such as fraud or mistake
that impaired effective consent to contract.53 This elevation of the principle of consent over substantive justice was strongest in the common law
systems.54 In the common law courts of England after it broke from the
Roman-based, European legal tradition at the Reformation, and in American courts that inherited the English tradition, judges insisted that the law
47. See Baldwin, supra note 31, at 22–27; Christopher K. Odinet, Commerce,
Commonality, and Contract Law: Legal Reform in A Mixed Jurisdiction, 75 LA. L. REV.
741, 777 (2015). For a lengthier discussion of the development of Just Price jurisprudence in European jurisprudence, see Brian M. McCall, It is Just Price: Entender
Los Males Económicos Modernos a La Luz de La Doctrina Social Católica, [Understanding
Modern Economic Woes in Light of Catholic Social Doctrine], in UTRUMQUE JUS: DERECHO, DERECHO NAT. Y DERECHO CANÓNICO 487 (Miguel Ayuso ed. 2014) (Spain).
48. After attempting to locate any historical studies that would permit a quantification of use of the doctrine in ancient and medieval courts, I contacted Professor James Gordley who confirmed to me that he believed no sources presently
existed that would permit such a quantification.
49. Odinet, supra note 47, at 778.
50. See Gordley, supra note 19, at 1625–26.
51. See Odinet, supra note 47, at 778.
52. See Gordley, supra note 19, at 1593, 1626.
53. See id. at 1592–93.
54. See id. at 1594.
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would not evaluate the adequacy of the consideration exchanged but
would inquire only if consideration of any value were present in formation
of a contract.55
Yet, even though the old Roman tradition of granting relief for extremely inequitable bargains was absent from the common law, a faint
shadow of the doctrine remained until the dawn of the nineteenth century. The courts of equity prior to the nineteenth century refused to order
specific performance of contracts in which the bargain to be enforced was
unconscionable, by which equity meant a bargain that was hard or oppressive.56 Thus, although no remedy could be obtained at law for an unjust
exchange, equity at least refused to assist one who would benefit from an
oppressive exchange by compelling the other party to complete the exchange. Even in the nineteenth century when English and American
courts had seemed to abandon the older tradition of granting relief (or at
least denying specific performance) in the case of greatly disproportionate
exchanges, remedies were sometimes granted (and specific performance
denied) in cases of hard bargains; the difference was that courts claimed
they were not acting on the fact of the unfair bargain itself but on the basis
of some flaw in contract formation such as fraud or mistake and treated
the unfairness of the exchange as being merely proof of the flaw in
formation.57
Common both to the Anglo-American and continental jurists of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a growing belief that value was
simply imponderable—no comparison of values was possible—and therefore no unjust exchange that the law should correct could ever exist.58
Whereas Aquinas recognizes in practice the difficulties of proving with
precision the variation from the just price in particular cases of small variation, he still believed that every variation in value was in theory unjust and
subject to correction by law (even if only by the divine law and not human
law). These later jurists conflated the practical difficulty of calculation
with the possibility of an unjust exchange existing in principle due to a
radical skepticism about the objective nature of value at all.59
Throughout the nineteenth century, the belief that value was imponderable resulted in a belief that no remedy could be based on a disparity
of value.60 Yet, even if their existence were denied in theory, unjust exchanges appeared before courts that, when faced with clearly disproportionate exchanges and unable to grant relief on this basis alone,
55. Id. at 1594–98; see also Brian M. McCall, The New Protestant Bargain: The
Influence of Protestant Theology on Contract and Property Law, in LUTHER AND HIS PROGENY: 500 YEARS OF PROTESTANTISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR CHURCH, STATE, AND
SOCIETY (Dr. John C. Rao ed., Angelico Press 2017).
56. Gordley, supra note 19, at 1598–99.
57. See id. at 1599.
58. See id. at 1598–99.
59. See id.
60. See id.
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entertained arguments that perceived disparities in value as evidence of
some flaw in the contracting process.61 In this way, courts could claim
they were not policing the substance of bargains but only the contract
formation process. Thus, the fragments of Just Price doctrine had to hide
in the shadow of contract formation.
This new exaltation of contract formation over substance was reinforced by another argument. Jurists in Europe and the United States seeking to abolish remedies for unfair exchanges introduced a new legal value
of autonomy that vitiated against remedying one-sided bargains.62 As Professor Gordley explains, the claim about the imponderable nature of value
and this new virtue of autonomy were connected:
For one who took the argument about value seriously, this argument about party autonomy was almost a corollary. If value is
“subjective,” then there is no source outside the agreement of the
parties by which one could judge the fairness of exchange. Interference by a court would not only be improper but arbitrary.63
If there is no such thing as objective value, no bargain can be inequitable.
Thus, when considering unequal exchanges, the nineteenth century approach did so as a proxy for finding a flaw in the autonomous bargaining
process. This approach vitiated the formation of any contract at all rather
than finding a contract existed but ordering a remedy for a substantively
unfair term.
E. Resurrection of a Concept in the Uniform Commercial Code
Out of this historical background, the concept of providing a remedy
for unfair contract terms officially reemerged with the promulgation of
the UCC in 1951.64 Section 2-302 of the UCC authorizes courts that find a
contract or term thereof unconscionable to choose among three possible
remedies: (1) to “refuse to enforce the contract,” (2) to “enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause,” or (3) to
“limit the application of any unconscionable clause.”65 Yet, this section
61. See id.
62. See id. at 1599–1601.
63. Id. at 1600.
64. See Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts: Adhesion and
Unconscionability, 66 LA. L. REV. 123, 149–50 (2005) (“[Unconscionability’s] acceptance as a mainstream doctrine, a ready aid in contract limitation, dates back only
to its inclusion in the UCC.”).
65. U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (stating “(1) If
the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to
avoid any unconscionable result. (2) When it is claimed or appears to the court
that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting,
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination”).
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does not provide a definition of what makes a contract or clause “unconscionable.” The seeds of a two-part definition involving procedural and
substantive unconscionability were present in one of the earliest modern
cases engaging with the doctrine, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.66
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia defined an unconscionable contract as one involving “an absence of meaningful choice on
the part of one of the [contracting] parties together with contract terms
unreasonably favorable to the other party.”67 From this seed, the prevailing wisdom developed that evaluating a clause or agreement for unconscionability requires a “two-pronged analysis: traditionally, a provision
must be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable to be held
unenforceable.”68 A quotation from a New Jersey Superior Court opinion
exemplifies the contemporary wisdom about what most courts require:
“For the most part, the unconscionability cases follow Williams v. WalkerThomas and look for two factors: (1) unfairness in the formation of the
contract, and (2) excessively disproportionate terms . . . . Most courts
have looked for a sufficient showing of both factors in finding a contract
unconscionable.”69 Procedural unconscionability refers to some aspect of
unfairness in the contract formation process.70 Substantive unconscionability refers to the unfairness of the terms of the contract itself regardless
of the process for forming the contract.71 The general consensus is that at
least some finding of both types of unconscionability must exist to prevail
on this claim, although courts may apply a sliding scale or balancing test
that would require less evidence of one type if proof of the other type is
overwhelming.72 Even if not explicitly required by all courts, Professor
Hunter speculates that:
[I]n reality, there will be few instances where a contract is so onesided as to “shock the conscience of the court” (substantive unconscionability) absent some strong evidence of unfair surprise,
clauses hidden in fine print, or the exercise of grossly unequal

66. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
67. Id. at 449.
68. McCullough, supra note 6, at 781 (first citing Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding
Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 1, 11 (2012); then citing Leff, supra note 4, at 487) (coining the terms
“procedural unconscionability” and “substantive unconscionability”).
69. Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 921 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 2002).
70. See TEMPLIN, supra note 1, at 371.
71. See id. at 375.
72. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1074
(2006) (explaining that this approach “implies that a minimum of one type of
unconscionability will suffice when there is overwhelming evidence of the other
type”).
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bargaining power during the process of contract formation (procedural unconscionability).73
Thus, although the ancient doctrine that the law could correct unfair exchanges reappeared, it still remained in the shadow of party autonomy
and contract formation.
In addition to the introduction of the concept of unconscionability
into the UCC, courts by the mid-twentieth century began to grant relief
under the common law for contracts or terms thereof deemed to be oppressive or unconscionable. After noting that the contract at issue was not
governed by the UCC because the parties formed the contract before the
District of Columbia adopted the UCC, the court in Williams remarked,
“[w]e do not agree that the court lacked the power to refuse enforcement
to contracts found to be unconscionable. In other jurisdictions, it has
been held as a matter of common law that unconscionable contracts are
not enforceable.”74 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts includes a
section authorizing courts to refuse to enforce unconscionable bargains.75
Yet, since these developments came on the heels of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries’ strong concerns for respecting the results of
bargaining and autonomy regardless of the injustice that resulted therefrom, the modern doctrine of unconscionability was, unlike its Roman law
ancestor, strongly rooted in the idea that some defect in the bargaining
process was a necessary condition for a court to refuse to enforce an
agreed term, even if the term was grossly unfair. Professor Eisenberg is
representative of the modern lens through which the modern doctrine is
understood. In 1982, he explained the centrality of the bargain principle
to contract law. By the bargain principle, he meant that “in the absence of
a traditional defense relating to the quality of consent (such as duress,
incapacity, misrepresentation, or mutual mistake), the courts will enforce
a bargain according to its terms.”76 Although Eisenberg endorses the bargain principle, he does argue for an expanded set of exceptions to the
strict enforcement for cases of unconscionability. Yet, his expansion of
cases in which deviation from strict enforcement would be justified is limited only to cases involving “exploitation of distress, transactional incapacity, susceptibility to unfair persuasion, and price-ignorance.”77 All of these
cases involve procedural elements, not the substantive unfairness of the
73. Hunter Jr., supra note 3, at 169.
74. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“If
a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.”).
76. Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 741, 742 (1982) (footnote omitted).
77. Id. at 754.
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term itself. Thus, even those arguing for a more expansive exception to
the bargain principle are only drawing the distinction between actual consent and some form of apparent, but not real, consent (as a result of coercion or unfairness in the bargaining process). Eisenberg’s approach
would deny relief to one who agreed to a greatly unfair contract if the
agreement was completely untainted by any coercion or bargaining flaw.
The bargain principle remains firmly entrenched at the heart of the unconscionability doctrine, and a remedy is considered appropriate only
when the bargain in a case is tainted.78 Thus, the doctrine of unconscionability is both new and old. It represents the reemergence of an ancient
principle that the law can correct unjust contracts. Yet, it has reemerged
in a different form and based on very different philosophical justifications,
autonomy and freedom to bargain rather than commutative justice.
II.

PRIOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES

This Article now turns from the historical to the empirical approach.
Before reporting the findings of the case coding project, it is necessary to
place this project in the context of prior empirical work. Prior to the case
coding project reported in this Article, several studies analyzed cases involving unconscionability. Some of these were limited geographically or
by court type, and others were limited to certain types of contracts or
clauses at issue. This Part summarizes the results and limitations of the
prior studies. None of these prior studies are directly comparable to the
present study, as they all focus either on a limited type of unconscionability case (price) or type of court (federal only or only certain state courts).
In contrast, the study reported in this Article looked at all reported cases
in federal and state courts and coded for more factors than any of the
prior studies.79
A. The Federal Case Study
In 2006, Larry A. DiMatteo and Bruce Louis Rich published an empirical study of 187 federal cases (the Federal Case Study) drawn from two
time periods (1968–1980 and 1991–2003) in which the federal courts considered the issue of unconscionability of a contract.80 Their data set was
limited to cases decided by federal (as opposed to state) courts and to
cases that mentioned UCC Section 2-302.81 Of the 187 reported cases that
met their criteria, they coded 148 cases after eliminating some cases as
inappropriate.82 The coding for these cases demonstrated that 56 cases
78.
1981).
79.
amined
80.
81.
82.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a, b (AM. LAW INST.

The Federal Case Study did code for many characteristics, but it exonly federal cases.
DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 72.
Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1093.
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(37%) resulted in the claim of unconscionability succeeding, of which 40
cases (71.43% of the successful cases) were coded as exhibiting both procedural and substantive unconscionability.83 Even though they limited
their data set to cases mentioning UCC Section 2-302, only 30% of the 148
cases were actually governed by Article 2 of the UCC as involving a contract for the sale of goods.84 New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey accounted for the largest percentage of the cases in the study (23%, 11%,
and 8% of cases, respectively).85 DiMatteo and Rich summarize their conclusions thus:
The findings support the hypothesis that it is very difficult for a
merchant to succeed in an unconscionability claim. It also confirmed the importance of section 2-302 methodology to the common law of contracts. The importance of factors such as the use
of standard forms and the level of education, sophistication, and
socio-economic status of the challenging party was confirmed. In
addition, the rarity of use by the courts of the remedy of reformation was confirmed. Finally, the success rate of unconscionability
claims has remained remarkably stable over the past three to four
decades.86
B. The North Carolina Study
A more limited study was published in 2014. Brett M. Becker and
John R. Sechrist II coded 89 cases that applied North Carolina law (the
North Carolina Study) in deciding the issue of unconscionability (drawn
both from North Carolina state courts and federal courts applying North
Carolina law).87 Becker and Sechrist found that the claim of unconscionability succeeded in only 3.37% of these 89 cases.88 They also concluded
that cases involving either a standard form contract or an unrepresented
party were more likely than other cases to be successful on the unconscionability claim.89 They also concluded that the data indicated both that
“the doctrine of unconscionability has increasingly been applied outside
the law of sales”90 and “unconscionability claims arising out of sale-ofgoods contracts are successful less often than are claims arising out of
other types of contracts.”91 Finally, they concluded that North Carolina
83. Id. at 1096.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1115.
87. Brett M. Becker & John R. Sechrist II, Claims of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of the Prevailing Analysis in North Carolina, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 633,
639 (2014).
88. Id. at 639.
89. See id. at 640–41.
90. Id. at 643.
91. Id. at 640.
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C. The Price Provision Study
In 1994, Frank P. Darr reported on a study limited to unconscionability claims relating to the price paid under a contract (the Price Study).93
The study examined 44 cases drawn from “three sources: Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, § 208 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and Lexis. The Lexis search was run in July 1993 under the request,
‘price w/5 unconscionability and date aft 1979.’ ”94 This study concluded
that the price was found to be unconscionable in 19 of the 44 cases examined (43.18% of the cases).95 Only 2 of the 19 cases (10.53% of successful claims) found the price to be unconscionable without also finding
some procedural unconscionability.96
D. The Arbitration Study
Susan Landrum conducted a study focused on the role of unconscionability in arbitration agreements (the Arbitration Study).97 This study
examined decisions coming from state appellate courts located in twenty
states between 1980–2012.98 The study found that of the 460 cases drawn
from twenty states, 51.52% involved arbitration agreements.99 This study
found that claims of unconscionability were successful in approximately
23% of the cases studied.100 The study compared the rate of success between cases involving arbitration agreements and all other contracts and
found that of the cases involving arbitration, 25% were determined to be
unconscionable, whereas in cases involving issues other than arbitration,
courts found contracts or terms unconscionable in only 20% of cases.101
Based on the findings, Professor Landrum categorized ten of the twenty
states included in the study as rarely finding contacts or provisions unconscionable (Colorado, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and South Carolina).102
She also categorizes the appellate courts of three states (Alaska, Arkansas,
92. Id. at 641.
93. See Frank P. Darr, Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 30 HOUS. L. REV.
1819 (1994).
94. Id. at 1842 n.141.
95. Id. at 1843.
96. See id.
97. See Susan Landrum, Much Ado About Nothing?: What the Numbers Tell Us
About How State Courts Apply the Unconscionability Doctrine to Arbitration Agreements, 97
MARQ. L. REV. 751 (2014).
98. Id. at 756.
99. Id. at 776.
100. Id. at 779.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 781 (classifying the states as “conservative” because they “rarely
find provisions unconscionable”).
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and Vermont) as having “shown a significant tendency to be sympathetic
to unconscionability defenses.”103 She categorized four states (Missouri,
Nevada, New Mexico, and Illinois) as having appellate courts that appear
“to be very sympathetic to unconscionability arguments, but only if the
challenged provision is part of an arbitration agreement. However, if the
challenged contract provision is not related to arbitration, these courts
rarely, if ever, find the challenged provision unconscionable.”104 Finally,
she characterizes Ohio and Mississippi as willing to entertain arguments of
unconscionability in a variety of cases, however “those arguments have not
had nearly the level of success that they have had in Alaska, Arkansas, Vermont, Missouri, New Mexico, and Nevada.”105
E. The California Study
In 2006, Stephen Broome published the results of a study of cases
involving unconscionability decided by California’s Court of Appeals (the
intermediate appellate court) between August 27, 1982 and January 26,
2006 (the California Study).106 Broome examined 160 cases and found
that the unconscionability claim was successful (either by rendering the
entire agreement unenforceable or by striking a particular provision) in
61 of those cases (38.13% of the cases).107 Broome’s main argument was
that California was more likely to find agreements to arbitrate (or an aspect of such an agreement) unconscionable than any other type of contact.108 He concluded:
[U]nconscionability challenges succeeded in about fifty-eight
percent of cases in the arbitration context. In the non-arbitration context, by contrast, unconscionability challenges succeeded
only eleven percent of the time. Thus, as a purely empirical matter, unconscionability challenges succeed with far greater frequency when the contractual provision at issue is an arbitration
agreement.109
III.

THE EMPIRICAL STUDY

This Part explains the methodology employed for the empirical study
and then reports and analyzes the results that emerged from the project of
coding the cases. A preliminary note about this Article’s approach to un103. Id. at 786.
104. Id. at 787 (footnote omitted).
105. Id. at 792. This study also included Montana but could not group the
results from this state into any of the foregoing categories.
106. Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability
Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 68 n.33 (2006).
107. See id. at 44–48.
108. See id. at 40.
109. Id. at 48.
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conscionability is necessary. This research was neutral about the existence
of unconscionability, the requirement of its substantive and procedural
prongs, and all the variables considered hereinafter. The literature on the
topic is quite limited. The few authors who have considered this issue
have constrained their research to a single type of unconscionability case
(such as price) or a type of court/jurisdiction (solely federal or a sample
of state courts). This Article offers a comprehensive study on unconscionability by analyzing state and federal courts and several types of clauses
(arbitration agreements, price, among others). Data about each unconscionability case and court was gathered from Westlaw, with neutral code
words and without interference with the results.
A. Methodology
The following search was conducted on October 29, 2018 in the
Westlaw “All States” database and on March 25, 2019, in the “All Federal”
database:
All reported cases that contain the words “contract” and “unconscionability” at least five times (and searching for variations on
the ending of “unconscionability” such as “unconscionable”) and
dated between January 1, 2013 and December 31, 2017.
This resulted in 440 state cases and 401 federal cases. Of the state
cases, 178 were eliminated as false positives, leaving 262 cases.110 The
search in the “All Federal” database returned 401 cases, of which 200 were
identified as false positives leaving 201 federal cases to be analyzed.
This search was selected after trying several different searches. A
search for cases using the West Key Number System with an unconscionability headnote produced a lower number of results and appeared to omit
some state cases that had not been given headnotes. A search using only
the word “unconscionability” appeared to produce more false positives,
and thus the word “contract” was added. To ensure the case discussed the
topic and did not merely refer to the terms in passing, the search was
limited to cases showing a minimum of five occurrences of the search
terms.
The time frame of 2013–2017 was selected to examine a significant
length of time and to eliminate any potential distorting effects of the
2007–2008 financial crisis. To the extent the financial crisis caused more
110. A case was considered a false positive if the majority opinion did not
clearly decide an issue of contractual unconscionability. Some examples of false
positives include a case in which the issue of unconscionability of a contract provision was only discussed in a concurring opinion, see, e.g., Ex parte First Exch. Bank,
150 So.3d 1010 (Ala. 2013), and a case in which behavior was evaluated as “unconscionable” under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (but not under the contract doctrine of unconscionability), see, e.g., Taylor v. First Resolution Invest.
Corp., 72 N.E.3d 573 (Ohio 2016).
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litigation or more claims of unconscionability to be filed, any such distorting effect should be diminished six years after the crisis began.
Each case was then coded to identify the year of the decision, the
court rendering the decision, and if a federal court, which state’s law was
applied. Appendix Table A lists the number of cases decided by each type
of court and the number of decisions reported in each of the years included in the study. Appendix Table B contains data on the number of
decisions and successful claims of unconscionability in each state’s courts
and under that state’s law when being applied by a federal court. Appendix Table C includes the number of federal cases by federal circuit and
district.
The cases were coded to distinguish those governed by the UCC (Article 2) and cases decided under the common law. The cases were also
coded for attributes or characteristics of the party claiming a contract or
clause to be unconscionable. Appendix Table D contains the results of
this coding. The cases were also coded to identify attributes of the contract negotiation process. Appendix Table E contains the results of this
coding. Appendix Table F contains a list of clauses that were coded by the
term or clause alleged to be unconscionable (e.g., price, interest rate, exculpation clause, agreement to arbitrate). Each decision was reviewed to
determine if the opinion explicitly required the finding of both procedural and substantive unconscionability (and if using a sliding scale) and
whether in fact the court explicitly found both types of unconscionability
to be present. Finally, each opinion was coded to distinguish cases in
which at least one claim of unconscionability was successful and, if so,
whether the court simply struck down the unconscionable clause or rewrote the provision to be legally enforceable.
B. Summary of Overall Findings
Of the 463 cases analyzed, 25.70% of the decisions resulted in at least
one claim of unconscionability succeeding (Success Rate). There was a
somewhat higher Success Rate in state courts as opposed to federal courts.
State court cases had a 28.63% Success Rate (75 successful cases) compared to only a 21.89% Success Rate in federal court (44 successful cases).
The Success Rate for state courts is slightly higher than the 23% Success
Rate reported in the Arbitration Study (which was based on cases from
only twenty states).111 This Success Rate for federal cases is significantly
lower than the 37% Success Rate reported in the Federal Case Study.
With respect to the 119 total successful claims in both types of courts, the
courts rewrote the offending contract term to make it enforceable in only
11 cases (9.24% of successful claims) and simply struck down or severed
the clause as unenforceable in the remaining 108 cases. Thus, both federal and state courts seemed more reluctant to rewrite unconscionable
clauses than to simply strike or sever them as unenforceable. Of the 11
111. See supra Section II.D.
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cases in which the offending clause was rewritten to be enforceable, only 3
were in state court. Almost all of the cases (8) involved an agreement to
arbitrate or a waiver of a right or related cause of action in connection
with an agreement to arbitrate.112 Chart 1 summarizes the overall findings comparing state and federal cases, and Chart 2 reports the action
taken by the court in successful cases.
CHART 1: OVERALL FINDINGS
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CHART 2: ACTION TAKEN
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112. Two of the 11 cases were price-related (1 involving an interest rate). A
third case involved the ability to extend the term of the agreement coupled with an
unfair commission structure. The other 8 cases involved an arbitration provision
or a waiver of a right that was severed from the agreement to arbitrate.
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The three states that reported more cases than any other were California, Ohio, and Texas. Chart 3113 presents the number of cases and Success Rates for this states.
CHART 3: STATES REPORTING
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Interestingly, these states are all different from the top three jurisdictions in the Federal Case Study, which were New York, Connecticut, and
New Jersey (although that study only examined federal courts located in
those states).
California is clearly the major outlier in that it decided more cases
than any other state, and its Success Rate was approximately twenty percentage points higher than the overall Success Rate for all cases in this
study. The Success Rate in California increased slightly from the period
covered in the California Study, which reported only a 38.13% Success
Rate compared to 46.67% in this study.114 The increase in the Success
Rate in California seems to be attributable mostly to a significant increase
in the Success Rate for provisions other than an agreement to arbitrate.
The California Study reported a Success Rate for challenges to agreements
to arbitrate of 58% (roughly equivalent to the current results) but only an
11% Success Rate for other provisions;115 whereas, this study found Suc113. California’s total becomes 46 if the Washington case applying California
law is included with the California results, and California’s Success Rate rises to
47.8% if the Washington case applying California law is included. Texas’s total
falls to 31 if the case applying Arizona law is excluded from the Texas results, and
Texas’ Success Rate rises to 25.81% if the Texas case applying Arizona law is
excluded.
114. The figures are not precisely comparable, as the California Study only
considered opinions from the California Court of Appeals (the intermediate appellate court), whereas this study included 2 cases from the Supreme Court of
California as well.
115. See Broome, supra note 106, at 48.
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cess Rates of 45.45% and 50% for arbitration and other clauses, respectively. If California’s results are excluded from the data, the Success Rate
for all other state cases falls to 24.88% from 28.63%.
Ohio’s Success Rate, in comparison, is only a few percentage points
below the overall Success Rate for all cases in the study and approximately
seven percentage points lower than the state court Success Rate. Texas’s
Success Rate is slightly lower than the Success Rate for state cases and virtually the same as the overall Success Rate. The variation from the overall
Success Rate of both Ohio and Texas is significantly smaller than California’s variance. Chart 4 presents the Success Rates for all states, other than
states that reported fewer than five cases, that had a higher Success Rate
than the national average.
CHART 4: STATES
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Interestingly, none of these states that reported significantly higher
Success Rates were included among the twenty states studied in the Arbitration Study.116 The district and courts of appeals of the Ninth, Fourth,
and the Second Circuits decided the most cases out of all thirteen federal
circuits. Chart 5 presents the number of cases and Success Rates for these
circuits.

116. See Landrum, supra note 97, at 756 n.10.
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These three Circuits accounted for slightly less than half of all federal
cases. These results differ from the Federal Case Study, which found that
most cases were decided in federal courts located in New York and Connecticut (the Second Circuit) and New Jersey (the Third Circuit). There
was not a significant difference between the Success Rate in federal appeals courts as opposed to district courts. Of the 31 appellate court decisions, only 7 involved successful unconscionability claims for a 22.6%
Success Rate. Of the 170 district court decisions, at least one claim of
unconscionability succeeded in 37 cases for a 21.8% Success Rate.
The circuit that clearly stands out as an outlier is the Ninth Circuit,
with a 50% Success Rate for all cases in its appellate and district courts (23
cases with at least one successful claim out of 46 cases). At the appellate
level, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vindicated at least one claim of
unconscionability in 4 out of the total 7 successful cases decided by all
federal appellate courts combined. This means the Ninth Circuit accounted for 57.1% of the successful cases in all federal appellate courts. If
the Ninth Circuit cases are removed from the calculation, the overall federal court Success Rate drops from 21.89% to 13.55%. Excluding all cases
from the Ninth Circuit, there were twenty-one cases in which at least one
claim was successful out of 155 total cases. Thus, the Ninth Circuit influenced the overall federal Success Rate more than California affected the
state court Success Rate.
Charts 6 and 7 compare the results in state and federal court for cases
applying California, Ohio, and Texas law (the states that reported the
most cases in the study).
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CHART 6: OVERALL FINDINGS OF STATE COURTS REPORTING
THE MOST CASES
Total Number of State Cases Applying State’s Law
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CHART 7: OVERALL FINDINGS OF FEDERAL COURTS APPLYING
APPLICABLE STATE’S LAW
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There were no cases in which even one claim of unconscionability
succeeded in the First Circuit (6 total cases), Third Circuit (13 total cases),
or Sixth Circuit (15 total cases). Excluding districts whose courts decided
fewer than 5 cases, the districts that had the highest Success Rates were the
Central District of California (6 out of 9 cases or 66.7%) and the Northern
District of California (9 out of 16 cases or 56.3%). The two districts that
recorded the lowest Success Rates, excluding districts with too few cases
(fewer than 5), were the Eastern District of Pennsylvania—with no success-
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ful cases in 6 total cases—and the Southern District of New York—with
one successful out of 12 cases (8.3%).
C.

Nature of the Cases

Of the 201 federal court decisions, circuit courts of appeals decided
31 (15.4%) and federal district courts decided the remaining 170 (84.6%)
cases. Of the state court cases, 75.6% were decided by intermediate appellate courts, 23.3% were decided by the highest state court, and 1.1% by
trial courts. The study only reviewed reported cases and this fact likely
explains the few state trial court decisions.
Of the state court cases, only seven decisions concluded that Article 2
of the UCC was applied to the issue of unconscionability (one case each
from California, Iowa, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Texas, and West
Virginia). In 3 of these cases the claim was successful rendering a 42.86%
Success Rate. Of the federal cases, only 11 decisions were rendered in
which Article 2 of the UCC was applied to the issue of unconscionability.
Only 1 case was successful producing a 9.09% Success Rate. The overall
Success Rate for the 18 cases was 22.22%. Thus, although the overall Success Rate on claims governed by Article 2 of the UCC is consistent with the
entire data set, there was a great disparity between federal and state cases,
although this result is based upon a small number of cases.
The UCC was relevant for only 3.9% of all cases in the five-year period
under review, a much smaller percentage than the 30% reported in the
Federal Case Study in the two time periods it examined (1968–1980 and
1991–2003).117 This suggests that cases directly applying the UCC have
been declining since the adoption of the UCC in the 1950s.
The total number of all cases reported declined throughout the fiveyear period. In the year 2013, 108 cases (46 in federal court and 62 in
state court) were reported, but by 2017, only 70 cases were reported (33 in
federal court and 37 in state court). Chart 8 presents the number of cases
by year as well as showing the percentage of all cases in the study represented by each year and the overall Success Rate by year.

117. See DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 72, at 1069, 1100.
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Some of this decline in number of cases may be explained by the
delay in reporting decided cases although such a cause was mitigated by
running the search in October 2018 for state cases and March 2019 for
federal cases. Thus, it seems likely that most cases would have been reported by that time. One explanation might be that some cases resulting
from the financial crisis of 2007–2008 were still in the system by 2013, but
such a conclusion is only speculative. Still, a final possibility is that as cases
are decided, fewer parties are raising unconscionability challenges. In
comparison with the number of cases (which is generally trending down)
the Success Rate was somewhat volatile over the period ranging from a
high of 34.44% in 2015 and a low of 17.14% in 2017.
D. Common Characteristics of the Parties or Contracts
Each case was coded if the opinion revealed any of a predefined list of
possible characteristics of a party or the transacting process. The goal was
to determine if the types of cases litigated shared any common characteristics. Appendix Table D contains the results of this coding. The most common characteristic of the parties alleging a clause to be unconscionable
was that the party was a natural person, as opposed to a legal entity such as
a corporation or limited liability company. In 75.81% of all cases, the
party seeking to invalidate a term as unconscionable was a natural person.
There was not a significant variation between state and federal court with
respect to this attribute (77.1% in state cases and 74.13% in federal cases).
The second most common characteristic (at 19.01% of all cases) was
that the party alleging unconscionability was described as vulnerable in
some way. A party was considered vulnerable if, for example, the party was
described as having weakened mental capacities, being in an emotionally
vulnerable state, or being particularly susceptible to undue influence.
With respect to a party’s vulnerability, there was a significant difference
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between federal and state court. Of all state court cases, 27.10% involved
a party described as vulnerable, but in federal court cases, only 8.46% of
the cases included this description. This suggests that vulnerable persons
are more likely to be able (for costs reasons perhaps) or willing to file suit
in state court. One factor that was significantly more common in state
court as opposed to federal court was economic status. Of the state court
cases, 12.21% described the party alleging unconscionability as being economically or socioeconomically deprived, weaker, or of a lower socioeconomic or economic status, whereas only 2.99% of federal cases included
such a description. Further, only 2.38% of the cases involved a merchant
alleging unconscionability. This is unsurprising given how few cases involved contracts governed by Article 2 of the UCC.
As to attributes of the contract negotiating process, the most common
feature of cases in the data set is that the contract was described as a
preprinted form in 46.89% of the cases, without much variation between
state and federal courts (49.24% of state court cases and 43.78% of federal
court cases). Interestingly, the contract was described as entered into online or digitally118 in only 7.34% of all cases. A higher percentage of federal cases as compared to state court cases involved digital contracting
(3.05% of state court cases but 12.94% of federal cases). This low percentage of cases is surprising, given that almost half of the cases involved a
standardized or form contract, and one would assume that most online
contracts are standardized or form contracts. Although not the primary
focus of this study, it was interesting to note that 76.47% of the 34 contracts identified as being entered into online or digitally required some
action like a click to agree119 to form the contract.120 This suggests an
active process of agreement is becoming a standard practice for online
contracting rather than simply disclosing terms and conditions that apply.
Other characteristics of the formation process that were statistically significant were (1) the party claiming unconscionability was not represented by
counsel in the negotiations (23.97%); and (2) the negotiations were described as involving an inequality of bargaining power between the parties
(24.19%). Of these two factors, the first was inconsistently common in
state and federal court. Of all state court cases, 78.63% noted that the
118. Online or digital was defined as a contract entered into on a website or
through a phone, app, or other digital means of contracting.
119. Active action meant that the online formation process required the party
agreeing to the proposed contract to perform some active action such as clicking
an “I agree” box or a confirmation of having read the terms of the contract as
opposed to the website merely stating that purchases were subject to terms and
conditions without any required click or other acknowledgment.
120. There was a significant disparity between federal and state court cases
with respect to the percentage of online contracts that required active agreement
to terms. Only 25% of the 8 contracts in state court required an action like click to
agree, whereas 92.31% of online contracts in federal court so required. This disparity may be a function of the very few cases in state court involving online contract (8 cases as opposed to 24 cases in federal court).
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party alleging unconscionability was unrepresented in the negotiations,
whereas only 17.91% of federal cases noted this factor.
The foregoing analysis considers how often these attributes appear in
claims, but how successful are claims that involve these attributes? There
are two ways to consider this question: (1) how many successful claims
involve these attributes or characteristics; and (2) what is the Success Rate
of cases with these attributes?
As to the first perspective, claims made by natural persons accounted
for 85.71% of all successful cases. There was very little variation between
state and federal cases on this issue. This means that being a natural person is the most common characteristic of all successful claims. The second
most common characteristic is vulnerability. Of all 119 successful cases,
39.50% of the successful cases shared this attribute. Yet, regarding this
characteristic, there was a significant difference between successful state
and federal claims. Of all 75 successful state claims, 52.00% involved a
party described as vulnerable; whereas, of the 44 successful federal cases,
only 18.18% involved parties described as such. This disparity is likely explained by the fact that cases with this characteristic accounted for a significantly higher percentage of all state cases decided as opposed to federal
cases, as discussed supra. Finally, although the attributes of lower economic status and lower levels of education did not account for significant
percentages of all successful claims (17.65% and 8.40%, respectively),
these factors were present at significantly higher rates in successful state
cases as opposed to federal cases. Lower economic status appeared in
25.33% of all successful state claims, but only 4.55% of federal cases. The
court noted lower levels of education in 12.00% of state cases but only
2.27% of federal cases.
Yet, how successful were cases with various attributes relative to other
cases exhibiting the same attribute? Appendix Table G contains comparative Success Rate data for these attributes. Comparing the overall Success
Rate of all state and federal cases of 25.70% to the Success Rate of all cases
sharing a particular party attribute, cases sharing five different party characteristic exhibited Success Rates greater than the overall Success Rate:
lower education level (55.56%), economic status (55.26%), a language disparity (54.17%), vulnerable party (53.41%), and claimant being a natural
person (29.06%). For each of these case categories, the Success Rate of
such cases in state courts was always higher than the Success Rate in federal courts.121 Several of these findings are consistent with the Federal
Case Study’s conclusion: the level of education, sophistication, and socioeconomic status of the challenging party was important.122 Consistent
with the conclusions of the Federal Case Study, merchants tended to be
121. Appendix Table G contains the data comparing the Success Rate in federal and state courts.
122. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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unsuccessful in alleging unconscionability, with only 9.09% of the cases
involving merchants as the alleging party succeeding.
Turning to characteristics or attributes of the contract or negotiations, Appendix Table H contains comparative Success Rate data for these
attributes. The three most common attributes shared by all 119 successful
cases were the contract was a preprinted form (58.82%), an inequality of
bargaining power (44.54%), and an unrepresented party in the contract
negotiations (33.61%). The first finding is consistent with the conclusion
of the Federal Case Study that the presence of a standardized form contract was significant.123 Except for the second of these three attributes,
with respect to which federal and state cases exhibited the same level of
these cases within their respective set of successful claims, state court cases
saw a higher percentage of successful claims involving preprinted forms
and unrepresented parties than federal court cases.
Cases that exhibited any of the negotiation or contract attributes,
listed in Appendix Table H, all had a higher Success Rate (calculated
based on the total number of cases exhibiting the applicable attribute)
than the overall 25.70% Success Rate. The three highest Success Rates
were in categories of cases involving (1) legalese as the language of the
contract (80%), (2) unconscionable language described as not conspicuous (70%), and (3) inequality of bargaining power (47.32%). The attribute with the most significant variation of Success Rate between federal
and state court was the contract being formed digitally. Cases involving
such methods of contracting had a Success Rate in state courts of 75% but
only 26.92% in federal courts. It must be noted that there were only 8
such cases in state courts that involved electronic contracting as opposed
to 26 in federal court. Two other categories with marked differences between federal and state court were (1) inequality of bargaining position
(58.93% Success Rate for state cases but only 35.71% for federal cases)
and (2) contract language written in legalese (83.33% Success Rate in
state court compared to only a 66.67% Success Rate in federal courts).
Chart 9 summarizes the total number of cases that contained an attribute that was in the five most common characteristics of all cases and the
Success Rate for cases involving each attribute. Chart 10 compares the
percentage of all cases involving these five characteristics to the Success
Rate for cases involving the characteristic.

123. See DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 72, at 1097.
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CHART 9: OVERALL FINDINGS OF CASES INVOLVING MOST
COMMON CHARACTERISTICS
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CHART 10: COMPARISON OF THE PERCENTAGE OF ALL CASES EXHIBITING
PARTICULAR CHARACTERISTIC TO THE SUCCESS RATE
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E. Types of Unconscionable Clauses
The contracts or clauses reviewed by the 463 cases in the data set were
coded as belonging to one of the 14 categories listed in Appendix Table F.
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In the data set, there were 479 clauses that were reviewed. Of these 479
clauses, 154 (32.15%) were found to be unconscionable. Chart 11
presents the 3 most frequently challenged clauses in the data set, the total
number of times the clause was alleged to be unconscionable (broken
down between challenges in state and federal court), and the Success Rate
for cases involving such clauses. Chart 12 contrasts the percentage each of
these 3 clauses represents of all challenged clauses in the data set compared to the Success Rate for each clause.
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As is evident from both Charts 11 and 12, the type of clause most
often alleged to be unconscionable in the data set was an agreement relat-
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ing to arbitration (289 clauses or 60.33% of the clauses considered), but
this clause was found unconscionable only seventy-two times or 24.91% of
the time.124 This indicates that although agreements to arbitrate were the
most litigated clause, they were found unconscionable at a lower rate than
the average for all clauses reviewed. These results were roughly consistent
with the Arbitration Study, which found that arbitration was at issue in
51.52% of the cases in its data set and found challenges to arbitration
succeeded 25% of the time. This relatively unchanged data suggests that
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion125
has not had as significant an effect on unconscionability challenges to
agreements to arbitrate as may have been anticipated.
In an appeal from the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that
federal law preempted, and thus prevented, courts from applying the “Discover Bank” rule.126 In Discover Bank v. Superior Court,127 the Supreme
Court of California held that, when coupled with a class action waiver,
certain agreements are per se unconscionable. Although Concepcion only
dealt with one type of agreement to arbitrate (one that involved a waiver
of a right to class action arbitration), scholars predicted the decision
would have a dramatic impact in preventing unconscionability challenges
to agreements to arbitrate.128 Some scholars predicted that Concepcion
eliminated all challenges to any agreements to arbitrate, not just those
including class action waiver as in Concepcion, on the grounds of unconscionability.129 On the other hand, Christopher R. Drahozal argues that
124. This coding for agreements to arbitrate was the most difficult and involved the most subjective judgment. This is because an agreement to arbitrate is
often intertwined with the waiver of other rights or the limitation of remedies.
Thus, a court might invalidate an aspect of the arbitration agreement that functions as an unconscionable limitation of remedies. Courts often blur the distinction between invalidating an agreement to arbitrate and in fact invalidating the
waiver of some other right or remedy that is connected to the agreement to arbitrate. In coding we tried to adhere to the language and categorization of the court
opinion. If the court described the unconscionability claim as being raised against
an agreement to arbitrate, the case was coded that way. After completing the data
analysis, I have concluded that the label agreement to arbitrate is a broad genus
that includes a variety of species of clauses that although differing from each other
all arise in the context of an agreement to arbitrate. A follow-up project to this
Article could involve drilling down in the agreement to arbitrate cases to more
particularly code each one.
125. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
126. See id. at 352; see also Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100,
1103 (Cal. 2005) (holding that under certain circumstances class action waivers in
consumer contracts of adhesion are unenforceable under California law).
127. 113. P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
128. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703 (2012); Maureen A. Weston, The Death of
Class Arbitration under Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 767 (2011).
129. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 323, 380 (2011) (arguing that after Concepcion “one wonders what if
anything is left of the doctrine of unconscionability in the realm of arbitration
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Concepcion “does not preempt all or even most state unconscionability doctrine as applied to arbitration agreements.”130 The results of this study
support Drahozal’s prediction that the case, notwithstanding its importance, would not have a dramatic effect on state law unconscionability
challenges to agreements to arbitrate. All of the cases in this study were
decided after Concepcion, and almost all of the cases in the Arbitration
Study were decided before Concepcion.131 If Concepcion wrought the death
of all or most unconscionability challenges to agreements to arbitrate, we
would have expected (1) the percentage of unconscionability cases that
involved arbitration to decline (if lawyers understood these claims to be
preempted), (2) the Success Rate for these clauses to decline if more of
these challenges were dismissed as preempted, or (3) both the percentage
and Success Rate to decline altogether. In fact, agreements to arbitrate
constituted a higher percentage of all coded clauses than in the Arbitration Study and the Success Rate remained relatively unchanged. Thus,
Concepcion seems not to have dramatically reduced the number of challenges to agreements to arbitrate based on claims of unconscionability or
reduced the Success Rate.
Beyond arbitration clauses, price terms were evaluated a significant
number of times in the data set. There were 65 clauses (13.57% of all
clauses)132 relating to price, of which 24 (36.92%) were found unconscionable. This Success Rate is a little lower than the 43.18% Success Rate
reported in the Price Study for the cases alleging the contract price to be
unconscionable.133 Excluding categories of clauses with fewer than ten
examples in the data set, the price terms category contained the highest
number of unconscionable decisions. Forum selection clauses also exhibited a higher than average Success Rate (36%). Yet, even though they
were the third most frequent clause to be challenged in the dataset, they
represented only 5.22% of all challenged clauses. Of the types of clauses
considered, the following categories exhibited Success Rates greater than
the overall Success Rate: (1) limitation of consequential damages
(50%);134 (2) a penalty clause (40%);135 (3) price charged (36.92%); (4)
agreements”); Arpan A. Sura & Robert A. DeRise, Conceptualizing Concepcion: The
Continuing Viability of Arbitration Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 403, 408 (2013)
(arguing that Concepcion “threatens to jeopardize a bevy of facially neutral contract
laws as they are applied to arbitration agreements”).
130. Christopher R. Drahozal, FAA Preemption after Concepcion, 35 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 173 (2014).
131. The Arbitration Study included cases through 2012, and Concepcion was
decided in 2011. See Landrum, supra note 97, at 751; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333.
132. Agreements to arbitrate and price related terms accounted for 73.90% of
all clauses alleged to be unconscionable.
133. See supra Section II.C.
134. There were only 8 cases involving such clauses (1.67%), and 6 of them
were in federal court.
135. There were only 5 cases involving such a clause (only 1.04%), and all of
them were in state court.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss4/2

36

McCall: Demystifying Unconscionability: A Historical and Empirical Analys

2020]

DEMYSTIFYING UNCONSCIONABILITY

809

forum selection clause (36%); (5) exculpatory clause (33.33%); (6) limitation of liability (31.58%); and (7) a unilateral right to terminate (30%).
Chart 13 summarizes the Success Rates in federal court, state court,
and state and federal combined for the three most commonly challenged
clauses.
CHART 13: CHALLENGED CLAUSES
350
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Success Rate in State and Federal Courts
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Of the clauses litigated in state court, there were 260 different clauses
alleged to be unconscionable. Of these clauses, 40% were found to be
unconscionable, which is greater than the 32.15% rate for the entire set of
state and federal cases involving these clauses. The data shows that courts
found decisions involving agreements to arbitrate and price terms as most
likely to be unconscionable. This is consistent with the entire set of state
and federal cases involving these clauses. Agreements to arbitrate accounted for 50.38% of the coded clauses considered in state court, and
price terms accounted for 17.31%. Together, these two categories accounted for 67.69% of all clauses considered. On the merits, price terms
were considered unconscionable at a higher Success Rate than both the
overall Success Rate and the Success Rate for challenges to price terms in
the combined state and federal cases data set. Of all price terms reviewed,
44.44% were found to be unconscionable in state courts. Agreements to
arbitrate were found unconscionable at a slightly higher rate in state court
than in the combined data set, at 28.03% compared to 24.91% in the combined data set. Other categories of clauses that included at least five examples in state court and that had significantly higher Success Rates in
state courts compared to the Success Rate of all cases in state courts included (1) limitations on the amount of liability of a party (45.45% out of
11 clauses); (2) exculpation clauses (38.46% out of 13 clauses); and (3)
elimination of an implied warranty (40% of 5 clauses). Only 1 type of
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clause—forum selection clauses—had a lower Success Rate in state court
(28.57%) than the combined state and federal court set Success Rate
(36%).
In federal cases, litigants challenged arbitration agreement clauses
the most, accounting for 60.27% of all clauses challenged in federal court.
Price terms were the second most challenged provision at 9.13%, but such
clauses represent a smaller proportion of federal claims than such provisions represented in state cases (17.31% of clauses challenged in state
courts). There was a significantly lower Success Rate in federal court for
price-related terms, with only a 20% Success Rate compared with 44.44%
Success Rate in state courts. Other categories of clauses that included at
least five federal cases and had significantly different Success Rates from
the federal and state combined data set for such clauses were (1) elimination of an implied warranty (with no cases succeeding compared to 20%);
(2) limitation of the amount of liability (12.5% compared to 31.58%); (3)
exculpatory clauses (20% compared to 33.33%); (4) choice of law
(16.67% compared to 25%); (5) class action waiver (4.57% compared to
17.65%); and (6) a unilateral right to terminate (37.5% compared to
30%). Except for clauses giving a unilateral right to terminate (the Success Rate for which was 7.5 percentage points higher in federal court),
every other clause in this list had a lower federal Success Rate than the
Success Rate for state and federal courts combined. The Success Rate for
challenges to forum selection clauses was marginally higher in state court
(38.89% compared to 36% for combined cases). These results are consistent with the overall conclusion that unconscionability challenges are generally more likely to succeed in state court.
F.

Legal Standard for Assessing Unconscionability

To test the validity of the myth that to succeed on a claim of unconscionability both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be
proven, all 463 cases were coded to identify whether the court explicitly
required evidence of both procedural and substantive unconscionability.
Chart 14 shows the percentage of cases in the study that explicitly required
proof of both types of unconscionability as opposed to those that explicitly
required only one type. It also highlights cases that did not clearly state
whether both or single type of unconscionability was required.
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CHART 14: PERCENTAGE
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Cases that Required Only One Type Unconscionability
Cases in Which No Clear Requirement Articulated

Fewer than half of the 463 cases in the data set explicitly required
proof of both procedural and substantive unconscionability to prevail,
which is purportedly the rule in most cases.136 A significant minority of
cases, almost 20%, clearly reject the presumed typical rule of a double
requirement. Chart 15 compares the data for state and federal court.
CHART 15: PERCENTAGE OF COURTS REQUIRING PROOF
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There is some variation between state and federal court, with federal
courts more likely to explicitly require both types of unconscionability.
Yet, even in federal court, just over half of the courts required proof of
136. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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both types. Chart 16 shows the results of this categorization of only successful cases.
CHART 16: PERCENTAGES OF SUCCESSFUL CASES USING
DIFFERENT PROOF REQUIREMENTS

26.05%
47.06%
27.73%

Cases That Required Both Types Unconscionability
Cases That Required Only One Type Unconscionability
Cases in Which No Clear Requirement Articulated
Interestingly, a higher percentage of cases in which claims succeeded
explicitly required proof of only one type of unconscionability (27.73%
compared to 17.28% in all cases). Although a slightly higher percentage
of successful cases required proof of both types, it was still less than half of
all cases.
The sliding scale or balancing approach, which requires proof of both
types of unconscionability but allows overwhelming proof of one type to
compensate for the sparsity of proof of the other, was announced as the
applicable rule in only 19.22% of the cases in the study (18.32% of state
cases and 20.40% of federal cases). Limiting the data to only successful
cases, a greater percentage of successful cases (31.09%) explicitly used a
sliding scale or balancing approach. Interestingly, even though approximately the same percentage of all state and all federal cases announced a
sliding scale approach, the variation between federal and state courts with
respect to only successful cases was greater. Of successful cases in federal
court, 43.18% explicitly stated that the court used a sliding scale or balancing approach compared to only 24% of successful state cases.
The foregoing analysis suggests that a two-pronged evidentiary standard for unconscionability may not be as universally entrenched in the law
as is commonly believed. The sliding scale approach is not typically announced in most cases, but it appears more often in successful claims.
In addition to what legal standard was articulated in the opinion, the
cases were also coded to identify whether the court specifically found pro-
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cedural and/or substantive unconscionability in the contract at issue. It
was hypothesized that courts in practice might almost always require a
finding of both types of unconscionability even if not always explicitly articulating this requirement as a legal standard. This hypothesis was proved
false by the coding. Chart 17 shows the breakdown of all successful cases
between those in which the court specifically found both types of unconscionability and those in which the court did not specifically find both
types of unconscionability.
CHART 17: PERCENTAGE OF SUCCESSFUL CASES THAT EXPLICITLY FOUND
BOTH TYPES OF UNCONSCIONABILITY COMPARED TO
CASES THAT DID NOT

48.72%
51.28%

Cases That Lacked Explicit Finding of Both Types of Unconscionability
Cases in Which Both Types of Unconscionability Were Explicitly Found

Although 45.36% of all the cases claimed to require proof of both
types of unconscionability, 51.28% of all successful claims were successful
without the court finding both types were present. If the applicable legal
standard were that proof of both is required, it seems surprising that not
even half of the claims that succeed meet the requirements of that
standard.
Chart 18 refines the data in Chart 17 by breaking down the cases
within the 51.28% of successful cases into (1) cases finding substantive
unconscionability but finding no procedural unconscionability; (2) cases
finding procedural unconscionability but finding no substantive unconscionability; (3) cases in which one type of unconscionability was found
and judgement rendered without even considering the other type;137 and
137. Within this group, 2 cases in the Ninth Circuit (1.68% of successful
cases) found procedural unconscionability and resolved the claim on that basis
without determining if the terms were substantively unconscionable. Fifteen cases
from the Southern District of Florida and the Bankruptcy District of Missouri
(12.61% of successful cases) found substantive unconscionability and decided the
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(4) successful cases lacking any finding of either specific type of unconscionability (the court merely found unconscionability in general).138
CHART 18: FINDINGS

OF
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Combining these results demonstrates that 31.11%, or almost onethird of all successful claims, were successful notwithstanding either an
explicit finding that one type of unconscionability was unproven or at least
ruling based on finding only one type of unconscionability without ruling
on the other.
Of the 44 successful federal cases, 11 (25.00%) specifically found that
the contract was substantively unconscionable but that there was no procedural unconscionability present. Yet these 11 cases concluded that, solely
on the basis of substantive unconscionability, the claim should succeed.139
Two (4.55%) of the 44 successful cases found no substantive unconscionability but nonetheless sustained the claim solely on the basis of procedural
unconscionability.140 One case (2.27%) found procedural unconscionability and resolved the claim on that basis without determining if the terms
were substantively unconscionable.141 Two cases (4.55%) found substanissue without making a finding on procedural unconscionability one way or the
other.
138. These cases came from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Central District of California, Northern District of Georgia, and Southern District of New
York.
139. These cases were decided by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of
Appeals and the following district courts: District of Arizona, Central District of
California, Northern District of Illinois, District of the District of Columbia, District of New Jersey, District of New Mexico, Eastern District of New York, Western
District of New York, and the District of Vermont.
140. Central District of California and District of Mississippi.
141. Ninth Circuit.
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tive unconscionability and decided the issue without making a finding on
procedural unconscionability one way or the other.142 There were 4
(9.09%) successful federal cases in which the court did not clearly state
whether both types of unconscionability were required and did not make
any specific findings as to such types. These 4 cases nonetheless found the
contract unconscionable.143 Of these 24 cases, 19 did not clearly state
whether proof of both types of unconscionability was required, 2 affirmatively stated that only one type was required, and 3 stated that both types
of unconscionability must be proven. Thus, 36.37% of all successful
claims in federal court determined a contract or clause was unconscionable either (1) notwithstanding a finding that one type of unconscionability
was lacking, or (2) without making any determination one way or the
other with respect to one type. When the 4 cases that made no specific
findings on either type of unconscionability are added to this total,
45.46% (slightly less than half) of all successful claims in federal court
succeeded without determining that both types of unconscionability were
present.
Of the 75 successful state court cases, 5 (6.67%) specifically found
that the contract was substantively unconscionable but not procedurally
unconscionable. Yet, these 5 cases concluded that, solely on the basis of
substantive unconscionability, the claim should succeed.144 Two (2.67%)
of the 75 successful cases found no substantive unconscionability but
nonetheless sustained the claim solely on the basis of procedural unconscionability.145 Thirteen (17.33%) cases found substantive unconscionability and decided the issue without making a finding on procedural
unconscionability one way or the other.146 One case (1.33%) decided the
contract was unconscionable on the basis of finding it procedurally unconscionable without specifically deciding if it were substantively unconscionable.147 There were 20 successful state cases (26.67%) in which the court
did not clearly state whether or not both types of unconscionability were
proven but nonetheless found the contract unconscionable.148 Of these
20 cases, 15 did not clearly state whether proof of both types of unconscionability was required, 2 affirmatively stated that only one type was required, and 3 stated that both types of unconscionability must be proven.
Thus, 28% of all successful claims in state court were successful notwith142. Southern District of Florida and the Bankruptcy District of Missouri.
143. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Central District of California, Northern
District of Georgia, and Southern District of New York.
144. These cases were decided by courts in California, Missouri, Ohio, and
Texas (2 cases).
145. These cases were decided by a Mississippi and Washington.
146. Cases were decided by state courts in Arizona, Illinois (3 cases), Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico (2 cases), Texas (2 cases), and Washington (3
cases).
147. Decided by a Texas court.
148. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Central District of California, Northern
District of Georgia, and Southern District of New York.
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standing that the court either found one type of unconscionability was not
present or made a finding with respect to only one type and ruled on that
basis alone. When the 20 successful cases in which the court made no
specific determination as to either type but simply ruled the contract unconscionable are added to this total, 54.67% of all successful cases were
decided without a specific finding of both types of unconscionability. Although federal courts in the study more frequently overcame a finding
that one type of unconscionability was absent and still upheld the overall
claim of unconscionability (29.55% compared to 9.34% in state court), a
higher percentage of state court claims were successful notwithstanding
the absence of an explicit determination of both types of unconscionability being present than in federal court (54.67% compared to 45.45% in
federal court).
G.

Logistic Regressions

In addition to the data analysis performed above, the coded data
identified in Appendix Table I was also subjected to a logistic regression
(Logit performed in Microsoft Excel using Real Statistics Data Analysis
Tools Using Newton’s Method and the cut off set at 0.5). The model produced appeared to fit the data. Nagelkerke’s R2 was reported as
0.838509.149 The model’s accuracy predicting successful claims was
0.866667, and its accuracy predicting failed claims was 0.985423. The
model reported an overall accuracy of prediction of 0.954644. The logistic regression produced the results for the independent variables identified in Appendix Table I.
Table 1 summarizes the results for the independent variables that appeared to be statistically significant.150

149. See Testing the Fit of the Logistic Regression Model, REAL STATISTICS, http://
www.real-statistics.com/logistic-regression/significance-testing-logistic-regressionmodel/ [https://perma.cc/7ENP-RV9F] (last visited May 8, 2020)
(“R2(N)=R2(CS)/1-e2LL0/n . . . Since R2(CS). cannot achieve a value of 1,
Nagelkerke’s R2 was developed to have properties more similar to the R2 statistic
used in ordinary regression.”).
150. I considered a variable statistically significant if its p-value was less than
.05, its Wald was greater than 1, and its odds ratio was between the upper and
lower ranges.
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P-value

OF

817

FIRST LOGISTIC REGRESSION

Coefficient
(B)
1.44118
Natural Person 0.041006
Low Economic 0.017422 2.298789
Status
0.024418 1.600735
Vulnerable
0.007338 -2.09193
Preprinted
Form
0.019434 3.886643
Online or
Digital
Contracting
0.027711 -4.51701
Online
Contract
Required Click
to Agree
0.040993 1.428811
Inequality of
Bargaining
Position
0.018452 1.729156
High Profit
Margin
2.61706
Elimination of 0.026703
an Implied
Warranties
0.006877 2.272081
Waiver of a
Right to Bring
a Class Action
Lawsuit
5.90427
Penalty Clause 0.002894

Exponent
Wald
(Odds Ratio)
4.225678
4.175766
9.962109
5.653363
4.956674
0.123448

5.06472
7.18826

48.74698

5.462006

0.010922

4.845989

4.173732

4.176291

5.635897

5.552747

13.6954

4.909926

9.699561

7.304705

366.5996

8.873093

Looking at the results in Appendix Table I, the p-values of the following independent variables relating to characteristics of the party claiming
unconscionability or the contract formation process suggest they had a
statistically significant influence on the outcome of the case: the party
claiming unconscionability was a natural person; the party claiming unconscionability was described as being of low economic status; the party
claiming unconscionability was described as vulnerable in some way; the
contract was a preprinted form; the contract was online or digital; an online contract required click to agree; and the negotiations were characterized as involving an inequality of bargaining power. Except for the
contract being a preprinted form and a requirement of click to agree, all
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these variables had a positive coefficient, meaning their presence made it
more likely that the claim would be successful. Finding a negative coefficient (-4.51701) for the presence of a click or some active indication of
agreement with the terms in an online contract is not surprising. In this
context, one can expect the more active form of contractual assent to mitigate perceived procedural unconscionability in online contracting. The
negative coefficient for the contract being preprinted is somewhat surprising, because a preprinted form suggests a “take it or leave it” negotiation.
The negative coefficient means that being a preprinted form made it less
likely that the claim would succeed. Perhaps an explanation is that those
using preprinted forms draft more cautiously because they are more aware
of the risk of unconscionability in the use of preprinted forms. This explanation, however, is mere speculation on my part. The variables with the
highest positive coefficient were (1) whether the contract was formed online or digitally (3.886643 which produces an odds ratio of 48.74698); and
(2) if the party claiming unconscionability was described as of a low economic status (2.298789 which produces an odds ratio of 9.962109).
Being a natural person rather than a legal entity made it more likely
that the claim of unconscionability would succeed. The coefficient for this
variable was 1.44118, producing an odds ratio of 4.225678. This characteristic was statistically significant with a p-value of 0.041006. Thus, natural
persons were 4.23 times more likely to succeed on claims than legal entities. Although whether the party claiming unconscionability was a
merchant was not found to be statistically significant with a p-value of
0.479864, this result may be due to the small number of cases involving
merchants (11, which is only 2.38% of all cases in the study). In any event,
being a merchant produced a negative coefficient of -5.75294, which indicates that merchants are less likely to succeed on unconscionability claims.
One result that differed from the findings of the logistic regression
performed on the Federal Case Study data was the presence of an attorney
assisting the party claiming unconscionability in entering into the transaction. The logistic regression in the Federal Case Study found that being
represented by counsel in negotiation made it more unlikely that a party
would succeed.151 The analysis performed for this Article asked the question in reverse. It coded, with a value of 1, cases in which the party claiming unconscionability was not represented by an attorney in negotiating.
Thus, the results of the Federal Case Study would lead us to predict that
the coefficient on this variable would be positive (i.e., the absence of representation would make it more likely that the claim would succeed). In
fact, this coefficient was negative (-1.09741), which means that being unrepresented made it less likely that the claim would succeed. This unexpected result might be due to the model finding attorney representation
not statistically significant (p-value of 0.16615). The unreliability of a neg151. The Federal Case Study reported a correlation of -.19 with a p-value less
than .01. See DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 72, at 1118.
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ative coefficient is also confirmed by the fact that 33.61% of all 119 successful cases exhibited this characteristic, and the Success Rate for all cases
that involved an unrepresented party in negotiation was 36.04%, which is
significantly higher than the overall Success Rate. Thus, the finding of a
negative coefficient itself seems to lead to an unreliable conclusion on this
point.
The p-value of the types of clauses at issue that suggest that cases involving such clauses are more likely to succeed include (1) a price that is
disproportionate to the costs of performance (high profit margin); (2)
elimination of an implied warranties; (3) waiver of a right to bring a class
action lawsuit; and (4) penalty clause.152 Among these four clauses, penalty clauses had the highest positive coefficient (5.90427, producing an
odds ratio of 366.5996).
Whether or not a court explicitly required proof of both procedural
and substantive unconscionability appears to have a significant influence
on the outcome of the claim. This variable had a p-value of 0.000208 and
its coefficient was -3.15874, which indicates that courts explicitly requiring
proof of both forms of unconscionability makes it less likely the claim will
succeed. An actual finding of substantive unconscionability had a significantly higher positive coefficient (8.583519, producing an odds ratio of
5342.874) than finding procedural unconscionability (4.964441, producing an odds ratio of 143.2285). The p-values for both variables suggest
statistical significance.
In addition to running the logistic regression on the independent
variables identified in Appendix Table I, a second logistic regression was
run on a slightly different data set. Several variables relating to identified
characteristics of the party making the claim of unconscionability were
combined to form a variable labeled “Lack of Sophistication or Vulnerability.” If at least one of the following variables was coded “1,” then this resulted in this combined variable being coded 1: (1) Party claiming
unconscionability had some language disparity; (2) Party claiming unconscionability was described as elderly; (3) Party claiming unconscionability
was identified as being of a lower economic status; (4) Party claiming unconscionability was characterized as having a low education level; and (5)
Party claiming unconscionability was described as vulnerable in some way.
The idea was to eliminate the finer distinctions among parties in different
cases to see the strength of the influence of any type of Lack of Sophistication or Vulnerability upon outcomes. In addition, the independent variables relating to the contract negotiation process were combined into a
single independent variable labeled as “Bargaining Inequality or Pressure.” If at least one of the following independent variables were coded
“1” in a case, this combined independent variable was coded 1: (1) Claim
of high pressure sales tactics; (2) Contract was a preprinted form; (3) Lan152. The p-value of elimination of consequential damages was just above the
.05 cutoff for statistical significance (0.055571).
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guage claimed to be unconscionable was described as hidden or not conspicuous; (4) Party claiming unconscionability was not represented by
counsel; (5) Language claimed to be unconscionable is described as
legalese; and (6) Negotiations were characterized as involving an inequality of bargaining power. In addition, the three ways in which a contract
price could be challenged as unconscionable (price, price cost disparity,
and an interest rate) were combined into a single “Price Clause” independent variable. In addition to combining some independent variables, a
few variables were eliminated from the second logistic regression because
they appeared in only a small percentage of cases. These eliminated variables were (1) whether the party claiming unconscionability was a
merchant; (2) whether the other party was a merchant; (3) whether online contracts required a click to agree; and (4) whether the UCC was the
governing law. Using this combined data set that included fewer variables,
the second model did appear to fit the data. The R2(N) was 0.795163.
The model’s accuracy at predicting successful claims was 0.8 and for predicting failed claims 0.982507. The overall accuracy of prediction was reported to be 0.935205. The regression produced the results for the
independent variables identified in Appendix Table J.
Table 2 summarizes the results for the most statistically significant independent variables.153
TABLE 2: MOST RELEVANT RESULTS

OF

SECOND LOGISTIC REGRESSION

P-value

Lack of
Sophistication
or Vulnerability
Natural Person
Price
Provisions
Waiver of a
Right to Bring
a Class Action
Lawsuit
Penalty Clause

Coefficient
(B)
0.000593 1.666012

Exponent
Wald
(Odds Ratio)
5.291023
11.79777

0.027404
0.007378

1.420643
1.733772

4.139783
5.661968

4.86519
7.178515

0.019935

1.856989

6.404425

5.417612

0.001433

4.966746

143.559

10.16285

Looking at the results in Appendix Table J, we can see that, based on
p-values, the combined factors comprising Lack of Sophistication or Vulnerability have a statistically significant impact on the outcome of finding
153. I considered a variable statistically significant if its p-value was less than
.05, its Wald was greater than 1, and its odds ratio was between the upper and
lower ranges.
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the contract unconscionable (p= 0.000593). But the combined variables
relating to Bargaining Inequality or Pressure do not (p= 0.96791). The
coefficient for the combined Lack of Sophistication or Vulnerability was
1.666012, indicating a case in which the party claiming unconscionability
exhibited one of the features in this combined variable was positively affected, or more likely to win. The odds ratio for this Lack of Sophistication or Vulnerability variable was 5.291023. A natural person bringing the
claim had a statistically significant impact (p=0.027404) on success (coefficient=1.420643 and odds ratio=4.139783). Of the types of clauses at issue,
the types that had the most statistically significant impact upon a finding
of unconscionability were the combined Price Clause variable, a waiver of
a class action right, and a penalty clause (p=0.007378, 0.019935, and
0.001433, respectively). Of these three variables, the clause being a penalty had the highest coefficient (4.966746) meaning it had the largest positive influence on the unconscionability claim being successful. The
coefficient for Combined Price and Waiver of class action rights were
1.733772 and 1.856989, respectively.
As with the logistic regression run on the complete list of variables, a
court determining that either procedural or substantive unconscionability
was present in the case made it more likely that the claim would succeed
(positive coefficient), and a finding of substantive unconscionability had a
greater impact on the likelihood of success (coefficient of 7.432545) than
a finding of procedural unconscionability (coefficient of 3.68461). Finally, as with the first logistic regression on the full set of variables, a court
announcing that proof of both types of unconscionability would be required made it more likely that the claim would fail (coefficient of
-2.73164, which was statistically significant having a p-value of 0.000123).
Table 3 summarizes the results relating to the two variables regarding
the court finding procedural or substantive unconscionability from both
logistic regressions.
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TABLE 3: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE
UNCONSCIONABILITY AND SUCCESS RATE

P-value

Court Required
Proof of Both
Procedural and
Substantive
Unconscionability
(First Regression)
Court Required
Proof of Both
Procedural and
Substantive
Unconscionability
(Second
Regression)
Court Found
Procedural
Unconscionability
(First Regression)
Court Found
Procedural
Unconscionability
(Second
Regression)
Court Found
Substantive
Unconscionability
(First Regression)
Court Found
Procedural
Unconscionability
(Second
Regression)

Coefficient
Exponent
Wald
(B)
(Odds Ratio)
0.000208 -3.15874
0.042479
13.76017

0.000123

-2.73164

0.065112

14.7515

0.000241

4.964441

143.2285

13.48256

5.89E-05

3.68461

39.8296

16.13691

3.47E-12

8.583519

5342.874

48.40342

1.04E-13

7.432545

1690.103

55.28191

From the results of both logistic regressions, we can draw a few conclusions. Courts explicitly requiring proof of procedural and substantive
unconscionability appears to result in more claims of unconscionability
failing to prevail. A finding of substantive unconscionability seems to be
more important in success than a finding of procedural. This conclusion
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is consistent with the finding discussed above that of the 119 successful
cases, 13.45% specifically found that the contract was substantively unconscionable but that there was no procedural unconscionability present and
12.61% found substantive unconscionability and decided the issue without
making a finding on procedural unconscionability one way or the other
which means that over a quarter of all successful cases were decided on the
basis of substantive unconscionability alone. This conclusion confirms the
similar conclusion drawn from the logistic regression performed in the
Federal Case Study that “substantive unconscionability which examines the
relative fairness of the obligations assumed can alone support an unconscionability claim.”154
Although the substantive unfairness of a clause or contract appears to
be very important in the outcome, parties that exhibit some characteristic
of vulnerability or weakness have a greater likelihood of success and
among the types of vulnerability comprising this composite variable, being
of a lower economic status had the greatest influence (based on coefficient value) on a successful outcome of the claim. Once aggregated, transaction or negotiation inequality or pressure did not (based on p-value)
have a statistically significant influence on outcome (some factors had negative coefficients and others positive). However, when that composite variable is disaggregated, the contract formation occurring online or digitally
and a finding of inequality of bargaining power both increase the chances
of success on a claim in a statistically significant way. Penalty and pricerelated clauses (which cases involve a quantitative evaluation of fairness)
are more likely to produce successful outcomes. Finally, courts appear to
have a predilection for avoiding class action waivers, as those clauses being
in dispute appear to increase the likelihood of success.
CONCLUSION
The first part of this Article dispels the myth that the principle that
courts should grant a remedy to address unfair or unequal bargains is not
a new legal concept (regardless of whether new is defined as mid-twentieth
century or the eighteenth century). The fundamental principle of justice
on which the unconscionability doctrine should rest dates to ancient times
and has roots in Roman law and counterparts in continental European
legal systems. The old principles were forgotten or neglected in the era in
which party autonomy and the bargain principle dominated contract law.
The ancient principles were resurrected in the adoption of Section 2-302
of the UCC and the adoption by the common law (as evidenced by the
Second Restatement of Contracts).
Part III dispelled the myth that unconscionability is unpredictable
and risks swallowing all the law of contracts. To the contrary, claims of
unconscionability seem to be both predictable and in decline, especially if
the trend of the five years under review is representative of an overall
154. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 72, at 1107 (footnote omitted).
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trend. Certainly, the direct legal relevance of UCC Section 2-302 has substantially declined in the past several decades. The Federal Case Study
found that the UCC applied to 30% of unconscionability cases in federal
court in the years it reviewed (1968–1980 and 1991–2003), whereas by the
time this study was conducted it applied to fewer than 4% of all cases in
the study. Thus, notwithstanding initial fears about Section 2-302, the Section seems not particularly relevant to the direct outcome of cases as measured by the number of cases in which it is the governing law.
The unconscionability doctrine, rather than expanding to swallow all
contract law, seems to be declining not only due to a declining number of
claims being brought but also as measured by a declining Success Rate of
claims. There is no comparable prior study with which the overall Success
Rate of this study can be compared. The Success Rate for unconscionability of a price-related term somewhat fell from the 1979–1993 time period
examined in the Price Study. The Price Study reported a 43.18% Success
Rate for price-related terms, but this study found only a 36.92% Success
Rate for such claims. If price-related claims are representative of all
claims, then one could tentatively conclude that the Success Rate has been
declining over the years.
Part III also dispelled the myth that the unconscionability doctrine is
unpredictable and inconsistent. The results of cases involving the doctrine seem highly predictable. Both logistic regressions were able to predict outcomes reliably, i.e., with extremely high levels of predictability
confidence (higher for predicting claims that would fail than those that
would succeed). Approximately 3 out of every 4 claims between 2013 and
2017 were unsuccessful. That means that we can reasonably conclude that
most claims will fail.
Not only is it easy to predict that most unconscionability claims will
fail, it is also relatively easy to predict which types of claims will prevail.
Approximately three-fourths of all cases reported in the five-year period
involved a natural person bringing the claim of unconscionability. This
suggests that contracts exclusively between legal entities are less likely to
result in litigation (at least among reported cases) involving this issue.
Cases in which the party alleging unconscionability (1) had attained lower
education levels, (2) was of a lower economic status, (3) was vulnerable in
some way, or (4) who had some language disparity or disadvantage, succeeded at significantly higher levels than other parties in the cases analyzed. The logistic regression confirmed that the attributes of being a
natural person, low economic status, and vulnerability were important in
determining outcome, and each of these attributes made it more likely
that the party would succeed. Importantly, parties that were characterized
as coming from a lower economic status were 9.96 times more likely to
succeed on their claim. This suggests that parties contracting with people
exhibiting such characteristics should be more concerned about unfair
clauses being struck down as unconscionable. Cases that involved form
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contracts, digital contracting, the use of high pressure sales techniques,
inconspicuous language, language written in legalese, negotiations that involved unequal bargaining power, or negotiations in which one party was
unrepresented by counsel all saw higher Success Rates (and in some cases
significantly higher Success Rates) than the standard 25.9% Success Rate.
The logistic regression confirmed that the following characteristics of the
contracting process were statistically significant: The contract was a form,
it was created digitally, and there was an inequality of bargaining power.
Except for a form contract (which had a negative coefficient),155 the logistic regression confirmed that the other two factors being present increased the likelihood of success. Parties in cases involving online or
digital contracting were 48.75 times more likely to succeed. These observations suggest that parties entering such contracts or negotiations should
be even more careful of the fairness of the provisions they include because
such cases have a history of at least one provision being found
unconscionable.
Although agreements to arbitrate were the most litigated type of
clause in the data set, accounting for over 60% of all 463 cases, these types
of claims were successful at approximately the same Success Rate as all
cases studied. The Success Rate of challenges to agreements to arbitrate
does not seem to have been significantly affected by the Supreme Court’s
decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. The following types of
clauses were successfully challenged as unconscionable at a Success Rate
higher than for all cases: limitations on consequential damages, penalty
clause, price charged, forum selection clause, exculpatory clause, limitation of liability, and a unilateral right to terminate. The results of the
logistic regression confirm that price-related terms, penalty clauses, and
waivers of class action rights are more likely than other clauses to be the
subject of a successful unconscionability challenge. This data suggests that
parties seeking to include such clauses should be more careful regarding
the contract formation process and the fairness of these provisions.
We can conclude based on these detailed observations that, in general, a natural person who (1) appears to be vulnerable in some way, (2)
agrees to an unequal price, or (3) agrees to be liable for a penalty, in a
context in which it is difficult for such person to find or understand terms
agreed to (in an online setting or a confusingly worded form), has
a greater likelihood of success in a claim that the contract is
unconscionable.
In addition to dispelling these myths, the data analyzed in this study
provided some interesting comparisons between federal and state court
and may provide some helpful information for litigators who have a choice
of venue. The apparent decline in the overall Success Rate is not as evident in state court as opposed to federal court. The Success Rate in fed155. I cannot explain the negative coefficient, which seems surprising given
the Success Rate for cases with such attribute.
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eral court appears to have declined significantly from the 37% reported in
the Federal Case Study to the 21.89% Success Rate found for federal cases
in this study. It is difficult to conclude whether the Success Rate in state
court has changed significantly because there is no fifty state study that has
been completed previously. The North Carolina Study156 reported a
3.37% Success Rate and the current study saw that fall to 0%. Yet, given
the small number of cases and the already very low Success Rate reported
in the North Carolina Study, it is not possible to extrapolate from this one
example whether the Success Rate in state courts has been declining. The
Arbitration Study157 did focus on state cases (although from only twenty
states, and as noted it excluded significant states such as California). If the
results from the same twenty states examined in the Arbitration Study are
extracted from the current study, these twenty states reported a 26% Success Rate (26 out of 100 cases), which is slightly higher than the 23% Success Rate reported for these twenty states in the Arbitration Study (not
limiting the Success Rate calculation to solely arbitration cases). Thus, it
seems unlikely that the Success Rate in state courts has changed overtime
in contrast with federal courts in which the Success Rate seems to have
declined.
If filing in state court, a party will have a greater likelihood of success
in California, Hawaii, New Jersey and Washington (with California’s result
being based on the greatest number of cases). Parties in these state courts
experienced significantly higher (at least double) Success Rates than the
average Success Rate. If filing in or removing to federal court, the Ninth
Circuit will most likely increase the likelihood of success with a 50/50
chance of a claim succeeding in that Circuit’s courts. Either the Central
or Northern District of California seems to be the most favorable federal
forum in which to try an unconscionability claim, and the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania and the Southern District of New York are the least desirable forums.
The final myth this study dispels is the myth that unconscionability
requires not only substantively unfair terms in a contract but some unfairness (or bargaining naughtiness) in the contract formation process. This
study confirms one of the conclusions of the Federal Case Study. Although concerns about the true presence of actual consent (procedural
unconscionability) are important in the way courts understand and apply
the doctrine the Federal Case Study noted the following:
Even if both elements of consent are present, the needs of consumer protection still dictate judicial intervention in clearly unconscionable contracts. This consent plus paternalism is seen at
work when courts intervene to police covenants not-to-compete,
antiassignment lease provisions, and liquidated damages clauses.
In these areas, courts generally make no distinction between boil156. See supra Section II.B.
157. See supra Section II.D.
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erplate and fully-negotiated clauses. For example, a fully-negotiated penalty (liquidated damages) clause between equally
sophisticated parties is just as unenforceable as one in an adhesion contract between parties of highly unequal bargaining
power. A penalty is simply unenforceable.158
Even though the eighteenth and nineteenth century jurists’ emphasis
on consent and autonomy over substantive fairness still has a profound
influence on how courts explain the doctrine of unconscionability,
roughly half of the time (as seen in the fact that only 210 (45.36%) of the
cases explicitly required proof of both procedural and substantive unconscionability), the ancient philosophical and Roman legal roots of the doctrine still run deep. Although 45% of the time the courts in this study felt
compelled to claim procedural unconscionability was necessary in addition to substantive unconscionability to prevail, over a quarter of all successful cases did not actually require a finding of procedural
unconscionability to succeed. In practice, some contract terms are simply
too unfair to be enforced even if freely and autonomously accepted (without bargaining naughtiness), even when courts feel compelled to recite
the incantation that proof of both procedural and substantive unconscionability will be necessary. Yet, we might ask would the doctrine be more
understandable and predictable if it shed this two-pronged test? Should
the law free itself of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries jurists’ obsession with autonomy and consent and openly admit that the power of the
law should not be assured to enforce any bargain no matter how unfair—
even if the negotiation process was perfectly and truly consensual and not
tainted?
Rather than a double requirement, the law could return to the requirement utilized by Aquinas: a remedy could be available either for intentional unjust exchanges or transactions that were exceedingly unjust.
The law could grant a remedy either for intentional exploitation or an
unjust exchange that was great in its variation from a proportionate exchange. Evidence of what courts currently label procedural unconscionability (and Leff called bargaining naughtiness)159 could be used to prove a
party intentionally took advantage. Since people’s subjective intent can
only be proven indirectly from their behavior, many of the characteristics
considered procedurally inequitable could be treated as evidence of intentional injustice, and if the court determined enough evidence was present
to prove intent, it could order remediation. Thus, when contracting with
vulnerable or poorly educated persons or when presenting take-it-or-leaveit contracts, parties would be well-advised to be careful to offer just terms
since these factors, if present in sufficient number and intensity to infer
intent, could lead to an invalidating of the bargain on the ground of intentional injustice. Further, when the injustice of the exchange is exceed158. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 72, at 1110–11.
159. See Leff, supra note 4, at 487.
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ingly great, the law could require a remedy independently of any need to
prove intentional injustice. Clear cases of exceedingly unfair contract
terms could be decided without the charade of inquiring into the presence of procedural unconscionability. Such a formal change in the articulation of the unconscionability doctrine—from a requirement of both
types to one of either procedural or substantive unconscionability—is
likely not to significantly affect outcomes since the data suggests courts
may in fact be doing what is proposed by ignoring the alleged legal standard in a significant number of cases. The proposal would have the merit
of making the doctrine more transparent and returning it to its historical
roots more explicitly. Those who either intentionally take advantage of
others or reap the benefits of vastly unjust exchanges should not count on
the power of the government to enforce their unjust spoils. Doing so
would be more transparent and historic (in a broader sense).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss4/2

56

McCall: Demystifying Unconscionability: A Historical and Empirical Analys

2020]

DEMYSTIFYING UNCONSCIONABILITY

829

APPENDIX
TABLE A: RESULTS

BY

Category
Federal court issuing opinion
State court issuing opinion
State trial court issuing opinion
State intermediate appellate court issuing opinion
State highest court issuing opinion
Federal District Court
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
Supreme Court of the United States
2013 Decisions
2014 Decisions
2015 Decisions
2016 Decisions
2017 Decisions

TYPE

OF

COURT

Results/Total Cases
201/463
262/463
3/262
198/262

Percent
43.4%
56.6%
1.1%
75.6%

61/262
170
31/201
0
108 (Federal 46; State
62)
101 (Federal 47; State
54)
90 (Federal 36; State
54)
94 (Federal 39; State
55)
70 (Federal 33; State
37)

23.3%
84.6%
15.4%
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State

Number
of Reported
Cases in
Period
Studied

AND

Number of
These Cases
in Which at
Least One
Claim of Unconscionability Was Successful

[Vol. 65: p. 773

SUCCESSFUL CLAIMS

Percentage
of Cases
with One
Successful
Claim

Alabama
Arkansas
Arizona2
California3
Colorado
Connecticut

4
3
3
45
1
2

0
0
1
21
1
0

0%
0%
33.3%
46.67%
100%
0%

District of
Columbia
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii

1

0

0%

3
10
1
6

1
0
0
3

33.3%
0%
0%
50%

Iowa
Illinois4
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana

2
13
6
No Cases
1
1

0
4
1
No Cases
0
0

0%
30.8%
16.7%
NA
0%
0%

Percentage of
Cases Decided
by a Federal
Court Under
This State’s Law
with One Successful Claim
(Successful/
Total Cases)1
0% (0/2)
0% (0/2)
28.6%% (2/7)
54.8% (23/42)
0% (0/5)
No Federal
Cases
12.5% (1/8)
0% (0/1)
0% (0/7)
40% (2/5)
No Federal
Cases
0% (0/3)
25% (2/8)
0% (0/1)
0% (0/3)
0% (0/8)
No Federal
Cases

1. This column includes more than 201 cases because a few federal cases applied the law of multiple states to the issue of unconscionability (typically because
multiple plaintiffs were alleging the claim under different state laws). The results
were thus included in each state’s category.
2. If the one Texas court case applying Arizona law were included in the Arizona results, then the Success Rate is 1 case out of 4, or 25%.
3. If the 1 Washington case applying California law were included in the California results, then 22 out of 46 cases succeeded for a 47.8% Success Rate.
4. If the 1 case applying New York law were excluded, the Success Rate
changes to 4 out of 12 for a 33.3% Success Rate.
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Number
of Reported
Cases in
Period
Studied

Number of
These Cases
in Which at
Least One
Claim of Unconscionability Was Successful

Percentage
of Cases
with One
Successful
Claim

Massachusetts
Maryland
Maine

2
2
1

0
0
0

0%
0%
0%

Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

1
1
8
5
6

0
0
2
2
2

0%
0%
25%
40%
33.3%

North Carolina
North Dakota
Nebraska

4

0

0%

1
2

0
0

0%
0%

No Cases

No Cases

NA

7
4
9
No Cases
32
1
2
5
1

4
3
1
No Cases
7
0
1
0
1

57.1%
75%
11.1%
NA
21.9%
0%
50%
0%
100%

New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York5
Nevada
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

831
Percentage of
Cases Decided
by a Federal
Court Under
This State’s Law
with One Successful Claim
(Successful/
Total Cases)
0% (0/3)
28.6% (2/7)
No Federal
Cases
0% (0/2)
0% (0/2)
50% (1/2)
0% (0/4)
No Federal
Cases
0% (0/3)
0% (0/1)
No Federal
Cases
NA
14.3% (1/7)
20% (1/5)
5% (1/20)
0% (0/1)
0% (0/7)
0% (1/0)
33.3% (1/3)
0% (0/6)
No Federal
Cases

5. If the West Virginia and Illinois cases that applied New York Law were added to these numbers, then there would have been 2 successful cases out of 11 for
an 18.2% Success Rate.
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South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas6
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington7
Wisconsin
West Virginia8
Wyoming
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11

3

27.3%

Percentage of
Cases Decided
by a Federal
Court Under
This State’s Law
with One Successful Claim
(Successful/
Total Cases)
0% 0/2

No Cases
4
32
1
No Cases
No Cases
9
1
7

No Cases
1
8
0
No Cases
No Cases
6
1
1

NA
25%
25%
0%
NA
NA
66.7%
100%
14.3%

0% (0/2)
0% (0/1)
28.6% (2/7)
0% (0/2)
100% (1/1)
50% (2/4)
42.9% 3/7
25% (1/4)
0% (0/5)

1

0

0%

No Federal
Cases

6. If the 1 case applying Arizona law were excluded, then 8 out of 31 cases
were successful or 25.81%
7. If the 1 case applying California law were excluded, then the Success Rate
changes to 5 out of 8 cases for a 62.5% Success Rate.
8. The 1 successful case in West Virginia was decided applying New York law.
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TABLE C: FEDERAL CASES

Federal Court

First Circuit
Court of Appeals
District of Massachusetts
District of New
Hampshire
(Bankruptcy)
District of Puerto Rico
First Circuit
Total
Second Circuit
Court of Appeals
Eastern District
of New York
Northern District of New
York
Southern District of New
York
Western District
of New York
Bankruptcy of
New York
District of Vermont
Second Circuit
Total
Third Circuit
Court of Appeals
District of New
Jersey

BY

COURT

OF

833

APPEALS CIRCUIT

Number of
Reported
Cases in Period Studied
2

Number of These Cases
in Which at Least One
Claim of Unconscionability Was Successful
0

Percentage of
Cases with
One Successful Claim
0%

2

0

0%

1

0

0%

1

0

0%

6

0

0%

0

0

0%

9

1

11.1%

1

0

0%

12

1

8.3%

3

1

33.3%

1

0

0%

1

1

100%

26

4

15.4%

0

0

0%

5

1

20%
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Federal Court

Number of
Reported
Cases in Period Studied
Bankruptcy Dis- 1
trict of New Jersey
Eastern District 6
of Pennsylvania
Virgin Islands
1
13
Third Circuit
Total
Fourth Circuit 3
Court of Appeals
8
District of Columbia
Federal Claims 1
District of Mary- 3
land
Eastern District 4
of North Carolina
Western District 1
of North Carolina
District of South 1
Carolina
Eastern District 2
of Virginia
Western District 1
of Virginia
2
Northern District of West
Virginia
3
Southern District of West
Virginia
Fourth Circuit 29
Total

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss4/2

[Vol. 65: p. 773

Number of These Cases
in Which at Least One
Claim of Unconscionability Was Successful
0

Percentage of
Cases with
One Successful Claim
0%

0

0%

0
0

0%
0%

0

0%

1

12.5%

0
2

0%
66.7%

1

25%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

4

13.8%
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Federal Court

Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals
Northern District of Mississippi
Southern District of Mississippi
Northern District of Texas
Southern District of Texas
Western District
of Texas
Fifth Circuit
Total
Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals
Eastern District
of Kentucky
Western District
of Kentucky
Eastern District
of Michigan
Northern District of Ohio
Southern District of Ohio
Middle District
of Tennessee
Sixth Circuit
Total
Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals

DEMYSTIFYING UNCONSCIONABILITY

835

Number of
Reported
Cases in Period Studied
1

Number of These Cases
in Which at Least One
Claim of Unconscionability Was Successful
0

Percentage of
Cases with
One Successful Claim
0%

2

1

50%

1

0

0%

1

0

0%

5

1

20%

1

0

11

2

18.2%

3

0

0%

4

0

0%

3

0

0%

1

0

0%

2

0

0%

1

0

0%

1

0

0%

15

0

0%

5

1

20%
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Federal Court

Number of
Reported
Cases in Period Studied
Eastern District 2
of Illinois
4
Northern District of Illinois
Eastern District 1
of Wisconsin
Bankruptcy Dis- 1
trict of Wisconsin
Seventh Circuit 13
Total
Eighth Circuit 7
Court of Appeals
1
District of Arkansas
2
Southern District of Iowa
Eastern District 3
of Missouri
1
Bankruptcy
Western District
of Missouri
District of South 1
Dakota
15
Eighth Circuit
Total
7
Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals
2
District of Arizona
Eastern District 2
of California
Central District 9
of California

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss4/2
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Number of These Cases
in Which at Least One
Claim of Unconscionability Was Successful
0

Percentage of
Cases with
One Successful Claim
0%

1

25%

0

0%

1

100%

3

23.1%

1

14.3%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

1

100%

0

0%

2

13.3%

4

57.1%

1

50%

1

50%

6

66.7%
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Federal Court

Northern District of California
Southern District of California
District of Oregon
Western District
of Washington
Ninth Circuit
Total
Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals
District of Colorado
District of Kansas
District of New
Mexico
Tenth Circuit
Total
Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals
District of Alabama
Middle District
of Florida
Southern District of Florida
District of
Georgia
Eleventh Circuit
Total

DEMYSTIFYING UNCONSCIONABILITY

837

Number of
Reported
Cases in Period Studied
16

Number of These Cases
in Which at Least One
Claim of Unconscionability Was Successful
9

Percentage of
Cases with
One Successful Claim
56.3%

5

1

20%

3

1

33.3%

2

0

0%

46

23

50%

1

0

0%

3

0

0%

1

0

0%

4

1

25%

9

1

11.1%

2

1

50%

3

1

33.3%

3

0

0%

4

1

25%

4

1

25%

16

4

25%
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TABLE D: CHARACTERISTICS

OR

ATTRIBUTES

[Vol. 65: p. 773
OF THE

PARTIES
Total Number
of All 463 Cases
that Include
This Attribute
(Percent of All
Case)

1 (0.38%)

Number of
Federal Cases
that Include
This Attribute
(Percent of Total Federal Cases)
10 (4.98%)

11 (2.38%)

7 (2.67%)

13 (6.47%)

20 (4.32%)

202 (77.1%)

149 (74.13%)

351 (75.81%)

16 (6.11%)

8 (3.98%)

24 (5.18%)

15 (5.73%)

4 (1.99%)

19 (4.10%)

32 (12.21%)

6 (2.99%)

38 (8.21%)

15 (5.73%)

3 (1.49%)

18 (3.89%)

71 (27.10%)

17 (8.46%)

88 (19.01%)

Characteristic or Attribute of a Party

Number of
State Cases that
Include This
Attribute (Percent of Total
State Cases)

Party claiming the contract to be unconscionable is a merchant
Party defending claim
of unconscionability) is
a Merchant
Party claiming unconscionability is a natural
person
Party claiming unconscionability has some
language disparity9
Person claiming unconscionability is described
as elderly
Party claiming unconscionability is described
as being of lower economic status
Party claiming unconscionability is described
as having a low level of
education
Party claiming unconscionability is described
as vulnerable in some
way

9. Language disparity means the party cannot read or understand the language in which the contract is made, or it is not the party’s first language or multiple languages are used not all of which the party understands. Here language
refers to the language of communication and not whether the words used are
legalese or hard to understand.
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TABLE E: CHARACTERISTICS

OF THE

CONTRACT

OR

839

NEGOTIATION PROCESS
Total Number
of All 463 Cases that Include
This Attribute
(Percent of All
Cases)

26 (9.92%)

Number of
Federal Cases
that Include
This Attribute
(Percent of Total Federal Cases)
14 (6.97%)

40 (8.64%)

129 (49.24%)

88 (43.78%)

217 (46.89%)

8 (3.05%)

26 (12.94%)

34 (7.34%)

2 (25% out of
8)

24 (92.31% of
the 26 case)

26 (76.47%)

15 (5.73%)

12 (5.97%)

27 (5.83%)

75 (78.63%)

36 (17.91%)

111 (23.97%)

12 (4.58%)

3 (1.49%)

15 (3.24%)

56 (21.37%)

56 (27.86%)

112 (24.19%)

Characteristic or Attribute of the Contract or
Negotiations

Number of
State Cases that
Include This
Attribute (Percent of Total
State Cases)

Claim of high-pressure
sales practices
Contract was a preprinted form contract
Contract was formed
digitally or online10
Online Contract requires some active click
to agree11
The language claimed
to be unconscionable
was hidden or not conspicuous
Person claiming unconscionability was not represented by counsel in
entering into the contract
Language of the contract was described as
legalese or not easily
understandable by nonlawyers
Formation process was
characterized by an inequality of bargaining
position.

10. The contract in dispute was entered into online, on a website, through a
phone, app, or other digital means of contracting.
11. The contract in dispute required before formation of the contract that
the party perform some active action such as clicking an “I agree” box button or a
confirmation of having read the contract terms. The percentages in this row are
calculated out of the total number of cases involving online contracts—not the
total number of all cases.
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TABLE F: TYPE

Provision AlNumber
leged to Be
of ClausUnconscionable es in
State
Court
(Percent
of All
Clauses)

Price Related
Claims12
Exculpatory
Clause
Elimination of
an Implied
Warranty
Limitation on
the Amount of
Liability of the
Other Party

OF

CLAUSE

Number of
Clauses
Found Unconscionable in State
Court
(State Court
Success
Rate for
Challenging
Such Clauses)

OR

PROVISION CHALLENGED

Number
of Clauses in
Federal
Court
(Percent
of All
Clauses)

Number of
Clauses
Found Unconscionable in
Federal
Court
(Federal
Court Success Rate
for Challenging
Such Clauses)
4 (20%)

45
20
(17.31%) (44.44%)

20
(9.13%)

13
(5.00%)
5
(1.92%)

5 (38.46%)

5
(2.28%)
5
(2.28%)

1 (20%)

11
(4.23%)

5 (45.45%)

8
(3.65%)

1 (12.5%)

2 (40%)

[Vol. 65: p. 773

0 (0%)

Total
Number
of All
Clauses
(Percent
of All
Clauses)

Total Number of
Clauses
Found Unconscionable
(Success
Rate for
Challenging
Such Clauses)

65
24
(13.57%) (36.92%)
18
(3.76%)
10
(2.09%)

6 (33.33%)

19
(3.97%)

6 (31.58%)

2 (20%)

12. This category was subdivided into the following three subcategories with
the following results:
Provision Alleged to
Be Unconscionable

Number of
Clauses in
State
Court
(Percent
of Category and
Percent of
All Clauses)

Number of
Clauses
Found Unconscionable
in State
Court (Success Rate of
challenges to
this clause)

Number of
Clauses in
Federal
Court
(Percent of
Category
and Percent of All
Clauses)

Number of
Clauses
Found Unconscionable in
Federal
Court
(Success
Rate of
Challenges
to This
Clause)

Total
Number of
All Clauses
(Percent
of Category and
Percent of
All Clauses)

Total Number of Clauses Found Unconscionable
(Success
Rate of
Challenges to
This Clause)

Price Charged

16
(35.56%
6.15%)

8 (50%)

5 (25%
2.28%)

0 (0%)

21
(32.31%
4.38%)

8 (38.1%)

24
Excessive Profit
(53.33%
Margin (defined to
9.23%)
mean the contract
price charged is
disproportionate to
the cost to produce
the goods or provide
the services)

10 (41.67%)

12 (60%
5.48%)

4 (33.33%)

36
(56.38%
7.52%)

14 (38.89%)

Interest Rate
Charged on a Loan

2 (40%)

3 (15%
1.37%)

0 (0%)

8 (12.31%
1.67%)

2 (25%)

5 (11.11%
1.92%)
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Provision AlNumber
leged to Be
of ClausUnconscionable es in
State
Court
(Percent
of All
Clauses)

Number of
Clauses
Found Unconscionable in State
Court
(State Court
Success
Rate for
Challenging
Such Clauses)

Number
of Clauses in
Federal
Court
(Percent
of All
Clauses)

Security Interest
or Other Collateral Granted
to Secure an
Obligation
Agreement to
Arbitrate
Forum Selection Clause

0 (0%)

1
(0.46%)

Choice of Law

4
(1.54%)

157
44
(50.38%) (28.03%)
7
2 (28.57%)
(2.69%)

2
(0.77%)
Waiver of Right 7
to a Class Action (2.69%)
Unilateral Right 2
(0.77%)
to Terminate
the Contract
Penalty Clause 5
(1.92%)
Limitation on
2
Consequential (0.77%)
Damages
260
Totals13

Number of
Clauses
Found Unconscionable in
Federal
Court
(Federal
Court Success Rate
for Challenging
Such Clauses)
1 (100%)

841

Total
Number
of All
Clauses
(Percent
of All
Clauses)

Total Number of
Clauses
Found Unconscionable
(Success
Rate for
Challenging
Such Clauses)

5
(1.04%)

1 (20%)

132
28
(60.27%) (21.21%)
18
7 (38.89%)
(8.22%)

289
72
(60.33%) (24.91%)
25
9 (36%)
(5.22%)

6
(2.74%)
10
(4.57%)
8
(3.65%)

1 (16.67%)

8
(1.67%)
17
(3.55%)
10
(2.09%)

2 (25%)

2 (40%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

2 (40%)

1 (50%)

6
(2.74%)

3 (50%)

5
(1.04%)
8
(1.67%)

104 (40%)

219

50
(22.83%)

1 (50%)
2 (25.57%)
0 (0%)

1 (10%)
3 (37.50%)

479

3 (17.65%)
3 (30%)

4 (50%)

154
(32.15%)

13. This line represents the number of all these types of clauses evaluated for
unconscionability by the cases in the data set, not the number of cases.
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TABLE G: PARTY CHARACTERISTICS

Characteristic or
Attribute of the
Party Claiming
Unconscionability

State Court
Successful
Cases with
This Attribute (Percentage of
All 75 Successful State
Cases)

IN

[Vol. 65: p. 773

SUCCESSFUL CASES

Success
Rate of
State
Cases with
this Attribute
(Total
State
Cases with
this Attribute)

Federal
Court Successful
Cases with
this Attribute
(Percentage
of All 44
Successful
Federal
Cases)

Success
Rate of
Federal
Cases with
this Attribute
(Total
Federal
Cases with
this Attribute)

Total Successful
Cases with
this Attribute (Percentage of
All 119
Successful
Cases)

Success
Rate of
Cases with
this Attribute
(Total
Cases with
this Attribute)

Party claiming the 0 (0%)
contract to be
unconscionable is
a merchant

0% (1)

1 (2.27%)

10% (10)

1 (0.84%)

9.09%
(11)

Party defending
claim of unconscionability is a
Merchant

14.29%
(7)

1 (2.27%)

7.69%
(13)

2 (1.68%)

10% (20)

Party claiming
65 (86.67%) 32.18%
(202)
unconscionability
is a natural person

37
(89.04%)

24.83%
(149)

102
(85.71%)

29.06%
(351)

Party claiming
unconscionability
has some language disparity.

9 (12.00%)

56.25%
(16)

4 (9.09%)

50% (8)

13 (10.92%) 54.17%
(24)

Person claiming
unconscionability
is described as
elderly

3 (4.00%)

20% (15)

1 (2.27%)

25% (4)

4 (3.36%)

Party claiming
unconscionability
is described as
being of lower
economic status

19 (25.33%) 59.38%
(32)

2 (4.55%)

33.33%
(6)

21 (17.65%) 55.26%
(38)

Party claiming
unconscionability
is described as
having a low level
of education

9 (12.00%)

1 (2.27%)

33.33%
(3)

10 (8.40%)

Party claiming
unconscionability
is described as
vulnerable in
some way

39 (52.00%) 54.93%
(71)

8 (18.18%)

47.06%
(17)

47 (39.50%) 53.41%
(88)

1 (1.33%)

60% (15)
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TABLE H: CONTRACT
IN

Characteristic or
Attribute of the
Contract or Negotiations

State Court
Successful
Cases with
This Attribute (Percentage of
All 75 Successful State
Cases)

Claim of highpressure sales
practices

843

AND NEGOTIATIONS CHARACTERISTICS
SUCCESSFUL CLAIMS

Success
Rate of
State
Cases with
This Attribute
(Total
State
Cases with
This Attribute)

Federal
Court Successful
Cases with
This Attribute (Percentage of
All 44 Successful
Federal
Cases)

Success
Rate of
Federal
Cases with
This Attribute
(Total
Federal
Cases with
This Attribute)

Total Successful
Cases with
This Attribute (Percentage of
All 119
Successful
Cases)

11 (14.67%) 42.31%
(26)

6 (13.64%)

42.86%
(14)

17 (14.29%) 42.5%
(40)

Contract was a
preprinted form
contract

46 (61.33%) 35.66%
(129)

24 (54.55%) 27.27%
(88)

70 (58.82%) 32.26%
(217)

Contract was
formed digitally
or online14

6 (8.00%)

75% (8)

7 (15.91%)

26.92%
(26)

13 (10.92%) 38.24%
(34)

Online contract
requires some
active click to
agree15

1 (1.33%)

50% (2)

6 (13.64%)

25% (24)

7 (5.88%)

The language
11 (14.67%) 73.33%
(15)
claimed to be
unconscionable
was hidden or not
conspicuous

8 (18.18%)

66.67%
(12)

19 (15.97%) 70.37%
(27)

Person claiming
29 (38.67%) 38.67%
(75)
unconscionability
was not represented by counsel
in entering into
the contract

11 (25%)

30.56%
(36)

40 (33.61%) 36.04%
(111)

Language of the
10 (13.33%) 83.33%
(12)
contract was described as legalese
or not easily understandable by
non-lawyers

2 (4.55%)

66.67%
(3)

12 (10.08%) 80% (15)

Formation process was characterized by an
inequality of
bargaining position.

20 (45.45%) 35.71%
(56)

33 (44.00%) 58.93%
(56)

Success
Rate of
Cases
with This
Attribute
(Total
Cases
with This
Attribute)

26.92%
(26)

53 (44.54%) 47.32%
(112)

14. The contract in dispute was entered into online, on a website, through a
phone, app, or other digital means of contracting.
15. Before formation of the contract in dispute, the contracting process required that the party perform some active action such as clicking an “I agree” box
button or a confirmation of having read the contract terms.
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TABLE I: RESULTS
OF

OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Coeff b
Intercept

S.E.

Wald

P-value

[Vol. 65: p. 773
ON

FULL SET

Exp(b)

Lower

Upper

-4.16612 0.844269 24.35019 8.03E-07 0.015512

Contract governed by
UCC art 2?

-1.56165 1.844573 0.716764 0.397207 0.209789 0.005645 7.796267

PC UC is merchant?

-5.75294 8.142616 0.499173 0.479864 0.003173 3.72E-10 27073.12

Other party merchant?

0.533991 3.477196 0.023584 0.877949 1.705726 0.001871 1554.905

PC UC is natural person

1.44118 0.705261 4.175766 0.041006 4.225678 1.060662 16.83511

PC UC claims some
language disparity

1.848827 1.380979 1.792331 0.180642 6.352364 0.424076

Claim of high-pressure
sales practices

0.397351 0.880127 0.203825 0.651651 1.487878 0.265095 8.350896

PC UC is described as
elderly

-0.60443 1.120377 0.291044 0.589553 0.546388

PCUC described a low
economic status?

2.298789

PC UC is described as
low education level

-0.02117 1.485027 0.000203 0.988627 0.979055 0.053303 17.98309

PC UC is described as
vulnerable in some way

95.154

0.06079 4.910973

0.96682 5.653363 0.017422 9.962109 1.497589 66.26894

1.600735 0.711282

5.06472 0.024418 4.956674

1.22955

19.9818

K is a preprinted form
K

-2.09193 0.780254

7.18826 0.007338 0.123448

0.02675

0.56969

K is online K

3.886643 1.663024 5.462006 0.019434 48.74698 1.872315

1269.16

Online K requires some
active click to agree

-4.51701 2.051919 4.845989 0.027711 0.010922 0.000196 0.609372

Language hidden; not
conspicuous

0.631585 1.290285 0.239603 0.624493 1.880589 0.149969 23.58233

Party claiming unconscionability was not
represented by counsel

-1.09741 0.792536 1.917328 0.166152 0.333736 0.070598

Language legalese; not
understandable by layperson

2.366611 1.439498

Inequality bargaining
power

1.428811 0.699164 4.176291 0.040993 4.173732 1.060217 16.43063

Price UC at issue

0.206284 1.043196 0.039102 0.843247 1.229102 0.159081 9.496376

Clause UC because
Price/cost disparity;
excessive profit at issue

1.729156 0.733804 5.552747 0.018452 5.635897 1.337666 23.74534

Interest rate to be
charged (including for
default) UC at issue

-5.51254 17.30362 0.101491 0.750047 0.004036 7.53E-18 2.16E+12

Exculpatory clause UC
at issue

0.240133 1.552126 0.023936 0.877048 1.271418

2.70291 0.100165

1.57765

10.6612 0.634605 179.1057

0.06069 26.63545

Elimination of implied
warranty UC at issue

2.61706 1.181072 4.909926 0.026703

Limitation of amount
of liability UC at issue

-0.5897 1.909089 0.095414 0.757404 0.554493 0.013149 23.38381
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Coeff b

S.E.

Wald

P-value

Exp(b)

845
Lower

Upper

Security interest or
other collateral granted
to secure payment UC
at issue

-4.75256 3.457797 1.889105 0.169303

Agreement to arbitrate
UC at issue

0.184406 0.625354 0.086956 0.768083 1.202505 0.353008 4.096273

Forum selection clause
UC at issue

0.316646 1.177423 0.072324 0.787982 1.372517 0.136551 13.79565

0.00863 9.83E-06

7.57307

Choice of Law clause
UC at issue

-0.7613 2.765372 0.075789 0.783087 0.467058 0.002068 105.5018

Waiver of class action
right UC at issue

2.272081 0.840664 7.304705 0.006877 9.699561 1.867143 50.38792

Unilateral termination
right UC at issue

1.610025 1.505029 1.144395 0.284726 5.002937 0.261904 95.56697

Penalty clause UC at
issue

5.90427 1.982114 8.873093 0.002894 366.5996 7.533784 17839.01

Limitation consequential damages UC at
issue

3.678007 1.921246 3.664875 0.055571 39.56745 0.916158 1708.856

Did court find procedural unconscionability?

4.964441 1.352023 13.48256 0.000241 143.2285

Did court find substantive unconscionability?

8.583519

Was evidence of substantive and procedural
unconscionability required by court?

-3.15874 0.851533 13.76017 0.000208 0.042479 0.008005 0.225426

Did court use sliding
scale or balancing test
for both substantive
and procedural unconscionability

-3.30422

10.1201 2027.093

1.23375 48.40342 3.47E-12 5342.874 475.9974 59971.54

1.37036 5.813924

0.0159 0.036728 0.002503 0.538824
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LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON CONSOLIDATED SET
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

OF

Coeff b

S.E.

Wald

P-value

Exp(b)

Lower

Upper

Intercept

-4.41948 0.797643 30.69909 3.01E-08

0.01204

Sophistication or Vulnerability of Party

1.666012 0.485041 11.79777 0.000593 5.291023 2.044901 13.69011

Bargaining Inequality
or Pressure

0.020338 0.505557 0.001618

Price-Related Term

1.733772 0.647105 7.178515 0.007378 5.661968 1.592762 20.12722

PC UC is natural person 1.420643 0.644073

0.96791 1.020547

0.37888

2.74893

4.86519 0.027404 4.139783 1.171498 14.62897

K is online K

0.927816 0.775027 1.433147 0.231251 2.528981 0.553658 11.55179

Exculpatory clause UC
at issue

-0.04995 1.302269 0.001471 0.969403 0.951276 0.074099 12.21237

Elimination of implied
warranty UC at issue

2.158958 1.092565 3.904751

0.04815 8.662105 1.017724 73.72535

Limitation of amount of
liability UC at issue
-1.17023 1.544533 0.574046 0.448656 0.310296 0.015034 6.404498
Security interest or
other collateral granted
to secure payment UC
at issue

-3.14218 2.695765 1.358616 0.243777 0.043189 0.000219 8.511574

Agreement to arbitrate
UC at issue

0.125538 0.553354 0.051469 0.820527 1.133758

Forum selection clause
UC at issue

0.129336 1.105158 0.013696 0.906836 1.138073 0.130454 9.928459

Choice of Law clause
UC at issue

-0.87235 2.189627 0.158722 0.690335 0.417969 0.005719

30.5463

Waiver of class action
right UC at issue

1.856989 0.797821 5.417612 0.019935 6.404425

1.34083

30.5905

Unilateral termination
right UC at issue

1.595869 1.370012 1.356893 0.244077 4.932615

0.33645 72.31592

Penalty clause UC at
issue

4.966746 1.557988 10.16285 0.001433

Limitation consequential damages UC at issue 1.853371
Did court find procedural unconscionability?

0.38327 3.353795

143.559 6.774363

3042.23

1.30176 2.027041 0.154521 6.381292 0.497563 81.84062

3.68461 0.917237 16.13691 5.89E-05

39.8296 6.598615 240.4136

Did court find substantive unconscionability?

7.432545 0.999645 55.28191 1.04E-13 1690.103 238.2393 11989.83

Was evidence of substantive and procedural
UC required by court?

-2.73164 0.711223

14.7515 0.000123 0.065112 0.016154 0.262456

Did court use sliding
scale or balancing test
for both substantive and
procedural UC
-1.84053 1.028372 3.203213 0.073494 0.158733
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0.02115 1.191295
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